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Abstract 
This thesis will chart the development of a “normative battleground” between the European 
Union and Russia within Ukraine. This “normative battleground” stems from the clashing 
securitising projects both the EU and Russia are implementing within Ukraine in order to shape 
the development of the country according to their own interests. The EU and Russia are widely 
believed to carry out securitising projects from within different international relations spheres. 
For this thesis, these are the EU’s “postmodern”/“Kantian” security project, which is 
incompatible with the Russian “modern”/“Hobbesian” security project. These security projects 
are manifesting themselves in the norms each side is promoting, and this is where the clash is 
particularly visible, this is the “normative battleground”. This thesis seeks to provide a holistic 
conceptualisation of the term “normative battleground” within the framework of Buzan’s English 
School Triad and to tie its development with the contrasting securitising projects being 
implemented within Ukraine.  
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Introducing the ‘Normative Battleground’  
 
When analysing the interactions of the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation 
(Russia), some have resorted to analogies centred around the different dimensions the two 
inhabit. German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is reported to have once complained Russian 
President, Vladimir Putin, was “living in another world.”1 Political scientist, Ivan Krastev, 
claimed that Russia “previously a Pluto in the Western solar system, has spun out of its orbit, 
powered by the determination to find its own system.”2 Political correspondent, Brian Whitmore, 
during a panel discussion accused the Russian and more Western leaning participants of 
“inhabiting parallel universes.”3 The different spheres the two powers occupy are clashing as 
they attempt to implement world views based upon these spheres within one country, Ukraine.  
 
The EU and Russia have been promoting norms they wish to frame Ukraine’s societal 
development within, so as to shape their neighbourhoods through those norms, and to secure 
influence in your neighbourhood in this way is a key way of guaranteeing security. These 
‘securitising projects’, as they will be named, are the subject of analysis for this research. The 
norms promoted by both the EU and Russia to frame Ukraine’s development stem directly from 
their corresponding securitising projects. The securitising projects of the EU and Russia, in turn, 
stem from the diverging ‘spheres’ each inhabits. These can broadly be classified, and this thesis 
will attribute a ‘modern’ framework for analysing Russia’s securitising project, and a 
‘postmodern’ framework through which to analyse the EU’s.  
 
The EU is an example of enacting a ‘postmodern’ approach to securitising, for example, by 
spreading liberal norms, such as the pooling of sovereignty, democracy promotion, strengthening 
of neighbouring states and interference beyond its borders. Whereas Russia is an example of a 
more traditional ‘modern’ approach to norm promotion, focusing on promoting norms such as 
respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, within its neighbourhood. 
These different approaches derive, at least in part, from each power’s recent history. The EU can 
be seen as forming in response to the “catastrophic rivalries” of nation states and nationalism in 
the early 20th century. Whereas, the Russian securitising project within Ukraine has largely been 
shaped by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and expanding EU influence. As Krastev has 
written “European nightmares are rooted in the experience of the 1930s. Russia’s nightmares are 
shaped by its existence in the 1980s and 1990s.”4 This normative clash was inevitable.  
                                                
1Tony Paterson, “Ukraine crisis: Angry Merkel questions whether Putin is ‘in touch with reality’ 3rd March 2014, 
[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10673235/Ukraine-crisis-Angry-Angela-Merkel-questions-
whether-Putin-is-in-touch-with-reality.html] <accessed 4th July 2017> 
2 Ivan Krastev, “Russia and the Post-Cold-War European Order”, March 2008, [https://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russia-
and-the-post-cold-war-european-order/] <accessed August 12th 2017> 
3 Brian Whitmore, “Europe, Russia, and Quantum Mechanics”, 29th May 2017, [https://www.rferl.org/a/europe-russia-and-
quantum-mechanics/28516968.html ] <accessed 19th June 2017> 
4 Krastev, “Russia and the Post-Cold War European Order”,  
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Ukraine has become the subject of these normative projects due to multiple factors, but primarily 
because Ukraine sits geographically at the border between the EU and Russia and therefore is 
significant to both in terms of security and stability. For the EU, Ukraine is a key neighbouring 
partner state and holds a centre position in the EU’s eastern norm promoting. For Russia, 
Ukraine is something to lose, and as Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuck said, Russia 
understands that without Ukraine, “it would not be able to take its place in the wider arena of 
Europe” and create a powerful structure in order to counterbalance the west. 5 This desire to be 
the dominant power shaping the development of Ukraine has added to the development of the 
“normative battleground”. 
 
As political scientist, Kadri Liik, has pointed out, that “Russia is a ‘challenge’ to the West has 
become conventional wisdom” but what is missing is clarity about the nature of the challenge.6  It 
is important to grasp a deeper understanding of what Russia is standing for and why. Liik’s 
argument, that the current standoff between the West and Russia is not over domestic models but 
is actually over the fundamental understanding of the international order, has framed this 
research. However, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that the disparity over this understanding of 
the international order, can be seen through the norms which are promoted, which then in turn 
also clash, creating the “normative battleground”. Furthermore Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna 
Wolczuk used the term “normative battleground” in 2012 to describe the situation in Ukraine as 
resulting from the competing EU’s Association Agreements and Russia’s Eurasian Customs 
Union. 7 The example they drew upon was largely economic, and this thesis seeks to take the 
term in another direction and apply it to the norms being promoted as part of the securitising 
projects, thereby building a fuller conceptualisation for the term. This research aims to take the 
realist connotations of a “battleground”, together with the “idealist” understanding of norm 
promotion and weave these together into one conceptual framework: a ‘normative battleground’.  
 
This thesis will argue that a ‘normative battleground’ has developed between the EU and Russia 
within Ukraine, and contends that this battleground stems from the conflicting securitising 
projects being projected into Ukraine; the ‘modern’ and the ‘postmodern’. The questions shaping 
this research seek to uncover how the ‘normative battleground’ has developed and secondly, to 
what extent can it be tied to the contrasting securitising projects of the EU and Russia. The 
theoretical framework for this research has employed Barry Buzan’s ‘Triad’, which provides a 
tripartite analytical framework based on different interpretations of international relations (IR).8 
                                                
5 Robert Coalson, ‘For Putin, Ukraine is too Important to ‘Lose’, 25th February, 2014 [https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-
too-important-to-lose/25276457.html] <accessed 4th July 2017> 
6 Kadri Liik, “What does Russia want?”, 26th May 2017, 
[http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_does_russia_want_7297 ] <accessed 29th May 2017> 
7 Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or 
Rivalry?” Chatham House Briefing Paper, Russia and Eurasia Programme, August 2012, p. 1 
8 Buzan, Barry, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004   
 4 
 
This framework allows the thesis to combine the distinct securitising projects under one holistic 
approach. It will use process tracing as the methodology, and makes use of a wide range of 
sources to build an understanding of the development of the ‘normative battleground’ through 
events and over time. The tracing of the ‘normative battleground’ is across three critical 
junctures in Ukraine; 2004, 2009, and 2014.  
 
As the ‘battleground’ develops over time, it will also become clear that the ties become more 
nuanced and so to do the style of promotion and the norms themselves. In part, the norms 
become ways of legitimising and promoting the securitising outlooks, rather than legitimising the 
norms themselves. Through this research it is possible to distinguish three distinct aspects of the 
‘normative battleground’. These three aspects stem from the Russian reaction to EU norms, and 
include their opposition to the norms being promoted by the EU within Ukraine, attempts to 
counter those norms, and lastly, a complete manipulation of their interpretation. These three 
aspects throughout the development are what build this “normative battleground”.  
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1: Constructing the ‘Normative Battleground’ 
 
1.1: Norms  
 
Before conceptualizing ‘normative battleground’ it is important to explain both why norms are 
important in IR, and why they have a role in governing international society. ’Normative’ is an 
ambiguous term and one which can be defined rather broadly. Therefore, a norm here is defined, 
in the simplest sense possible, as a “standard of appropriate behaviour”9. Ian Manners defines 
international norms as “shorthand for what passes as ‘normal’” in IR, and accordingly, normative 
power should be understood as the ability to shape or change what passes for normal.10 Foreign 
policies are constructed and conducted in a world of international and national norms which help 
define the goals and purposes of these states. While norms do not establish clear policy options 
for an actor, they can offer a general vision and direction, provide motivations, and be seen as 
providing ‘road maps’ for foreign policy action.11 Furthermore, it is important to note that while 
norms do not necessarily identify behaviour, they do allow us to identify notions of what 
behaviour ought to be.12 
 
An important distinction is the one between terms such as ‘norms’, ‘rules’, ‘values’ and 
‘principles’. These terms are scattered throughout IR literature and yet clear distinctions are not 
often given. For this thesis it will be important to identify norms and norm promotion over rules 
and values. Yet Barry Buzan explains that “all [terms] are linked by the idea that their existence 
should shape expectations about the behaviour of members of a social group”, and queries 
whether norms and rules are just shaded variations of the same thing. 13 Stephen Krasner wrote 
that “principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
actions.” However, Buzan points out that Krasner’s distinctions between norms and rules seem 
to hinge on formality; both aim to regulate behaviour and both are authoritative, and therefore it 
is fundamentally unclear how these two concepts can be disentangled.14 The unavoidable 
entanglements among Krasner’s definitions explain why these terms are so often grouped 
together, and therefore hard to separate.    
 
                                                
9 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” in International Organisation, 
Vol, 52, No. 4, 1998, pp. 887-917, p. 891 
10 Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, “Not So Wide: Reconsidering the Normative Power of the EU in European Foreign Policy” in 
Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2. 2010, p. 56 
11 Annika Bjorkddahl, “Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections” in Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2002,  pp 9-23, p. 22 
12 Bjorkddahl, “Norms in International Relations”, p. 20 
13 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 163 
14 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 164 
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To declare that norms matter within IR is no longer a controversial statement. Annika Björkdahl 
argued that scholars are now concerned more with how, when and why norms emanate and 
evolve.15 Even Hans Morgenthau, the father of realism, defined power as “a psychological 
relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised ... [which] gives the 
former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the former exert on the 
latter’s minds”16 In doing so, Morgenthau was addressing the notion of power outside of material 
power, that is, the importance of power over ideas within international society. In this sense, 
norms can contribute to a state’s power and influence, and that physical power can be less 
valuable than psychological or normative power. In addition, H.E. Carr wrote that “political 
action must be based on a coordination of morality and power.” Realism fails, in Carr’s analysis, 
precisely because it excludes essential features of politics like “emotional appeal to a political 
goal and grounds for moral judgement.”17 Therefore, importantly for this concept, the presence 
of norms and their impact on international society is no longer seriously disputed.  
 
1.1.1: The EU as a ‘Normative Power’ 
 
In 2002, Ian Manners famously labelled the EU as a “normative power”.18 This label reframed 
our ideas of the EU, and realised the EU’s normative influence in world politics. For Manners, 
the EU transcended traditional Westphalian norms and has evolved into a hybrid of supranational 
and international form of governance.19 In highlighting this further, the former President of the 
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, famously argued that the EU is “one of the most 
important, if not the most important, normative power in the world.”20 
The identity of the EU is closely tied to the norms it promotes, and for Manners, the label 
‘normative power’ is applicable because of “the degree to which national interest and 
international relations, with their emphases on security and order, are cultivated into discourses 
regarding justice and human-centric concerns.”21 Manners wrote how the EU is constructed, not 
only on a normative basis, but that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in international 
society.22 The EU’s “normative power” means it has the power to construct the interests and 
identities of its neighbours using norms that “shape external identities through non-coercive 
means separate from economic, military or even civilian power”.23  The EU is not simply being 
                                                
15 Bjorkddahl, “Norms in International Relations”, p. 9 
16 Tatiana Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power: Change and Continuity” in Europe-Asia Studies, 
Vol 63, No. 3, pp 371-390, 2016, p. 373 
17 Finnemore & Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics”, p. 899 
18 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” in JCMS, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, p. 235 
19 Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”, p. 240 
20 Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 371 
21 Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU, Panel 1D, 31st May, 2001, ‘The European 
Union between International and World Society’, Biennial Conference, Wisconsin. p.8  
22 Manners, “The EU and the English School”, p. 9 
23 Romaniuk, “Not So Wide, Europe”, p. 56 
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altruistic with its norm promotion, as it is also a method of securitising. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership form a core aspect of the EU’s external norm 
promotion and the EU is “unequivocal about the aim of these policies: to establish stability and 
prosperity on its periphery, and as a result foster sustainable security in its broadest sense.”24 The 
EU challenges traditional notions of statehood by viewing boundaries as more porous, and of 
security “which precipitated a ‘multi layered conception of political and security space going 
well beyond the borders of Europe.”25 
 
1.1.2:  Russia as a ‘Normative Power’?   
 
Russia, as described by Tatiana Romanova, is probably the best illustration of the unease with 
which the EU’s normative power is met. Russia also sees norm promotion by the EU as “empty 
talk” and as an “instrument for manipulation and promotion of geopolitical objectives”.26 
However, Russian foreign policy has steadily being given more prominence to norms, 
demonstrating Russia’s increasing use. While Russia has not always been an obvious norm 
promoter, it is possible to trace the growing prominence given to its normative role in Russia’s 
foreign policy through the Foreign Policy Concept documents from 2000 to 2016. The 2000 
Russian Foreign Policy Concept (FPC)27, for example, does not emphasise Russia’s normative 
role, and yet by the 2008 FPC refers to how “global competition is acquiring a civilisational 
dimension”, and talks of “competition between different value systems”28 In the 2013 FPC, this 
idea progressed beyond “competition”, stating how “various values and models of development 
based on the universal principles of democracy and market economy start to clash”29. The 2013 
document specifically referred to the increased use of “soft power” to “exert political pressure on 
sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate 
public opinion”. Russia in 2013 positions itself as playing a unique role as a “counterbalance in 
international affairs,” and this idea can be seen in the alternative norms Russia promotes. The 
2016 document further emphasizes how Russia’s foreign policy is aimed at creating international 
stability based on “generally accepted norms of international law and principles of equal rights, 
mutual respect and noninterference in domestic affairs of State, so as to ensure solid and equal 
                                                
24 Derek Averre, “Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighbourhood” in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, 
No. 10, December 2009, p. 1694  
25 Elena Korosteleva, “The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbours?” in Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics, Vol 27, No.1, 2011,  p. 4 
26 Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 375 
27 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June, 2000, 
[https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm] <accessed January 10th 2017> 
28 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, January, 2008, [http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116] <accessed 
January 10th 2017> 
29 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 18th February, 2013, 
[http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186] <accessed 
January 10th 2017> 
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security for each and every member of the global community.”30  The growing importance 
Russia attaches to norm promotion as part of their foreign policy can lead us to, while maybe not 
classify Russia as a ‘normative power’, still acknowledge that Russia is promoting norms. For 
Russia, the desire to promote norms and to shape the neighbourhood, particularly Ukraine, forms 
part of their securitising project. The norms Russia seeks to promote are to counter the growing 
influence of EU norms and to preserve Ukraine as a key state within their ‘sphere of influence’.  
 
1.2: Legitimacy and Norms  
 
As the previous section confirmed the importance of norms in IR and helped to classify what 
type of ‘normative powers’ the EU and Russia are, it is important to next address the question of 
legitimacy of norm promotion. It is necessary to address in order to assess what gives certain 
norms legitimacy over others within the international system and whether some norms are 
inherently more legitimate than others. This is important for conceptualisation of the ‘normative 
battleground’ as it is attempting to analyse a clash between two sets of norms, both perceived by 
the promoters to be legitimate. Steven Dixon has explained that the advancement of a norm is 
synonymous with the acquisition of legitimacy.31 Therefore, in order for a norm to be successful, 
it needs to be presented as legitimate, and legitimacy can thus be considered the “language and 
currency of norms”. For Ian Clark however, “legitimacy is a process by which norms emerge and 
are adhered to, not an inherent property.”32 For Clark, legitimacy can be envisaged as a 
“contested political process, drawing upon both [existing] norms and material power.” Meaning, 
it is not the norm itself that necessarily has legitimacy, but the process through which the norm is 
‘normalised’ is what gives it legitimacy. Dixon claims that the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ use existing 
moral and legal normative context, alongside material power, in order to legitimize a new 
norm.33 States care about legitimisation in international society as it can be essential to the 
perceptions of domestic legitimacy held by a state’s citizens. States can be seen to comply with 
international norms to demonstrate that they have adapted to, and can adapt to, the social 
environment; that they ‘belong’.34 For Finnemore and Sikkink, by definition, “there are no bad 
norms from the vantage point of those who promote the norm”35 and thus, bad norms are not 
normal. Overall, states need to legitimize their norms in order for them to be successful, and 
these norms can help legitimize a state's behaviour. As Ann Florini explains, it doesn’t matter 
how a norm arises, it must take on an aura of legitimacy before it can be considered a norm.36 
                                                
30 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 1st December, 2016 
[http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248] <accessed 
January 10th 2017> 
31 Steven Dixon, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Novel Constructivist Analysis of Norms and Behaviour” in Journal of Politics 
& International Studies, Vol. 9, Summer 2013, p. 139 
32 Clark, Ian, International Legitimacy and World Society, Oxford Scholarship Online,  2007, p. 15   
33 Dixon, “Humanitarian Intervention”, p. 143 
34 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics”, p. 903 
35 Manners, ‘The International role of the EU’, p. 10  
36 Manners, ‘The International role of the EU’, p. 10 
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For the EU and Russia, both perceive their norms to be legitimate for promotion with Ukraine, 
and this is a formative aspect in the development of the ‘normative battleground’. 
 
1.2.1:  The EU and Russia: Legitimising the norms 
 
The EU gains legitimacy for the norms they promote through their sui generis nature. As 
Nathalie Tocci explained, “what the EU is has been considered as the principal explanation for 
what it does beyond its borders.”37 The EU sees the norms it promotes as legitimate as they are 
the same norms they adhere to internally. These norms have their roots in European treaties, for 
example, the 2007 Treaty on European Union lays out the general provisions of the EU’s 
external action and specific provisions on the common and foreign security policy. It states that 
“the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the 
wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”38 Therefore, the 
EU finds legitimacy for the norms they promote as they, in their own words, inspired its own 
creation.  
 
Russia also seeks to confirm and demonstrate the legitimacy of the norms it promotes. In the 
2005 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin stressed that Russian norms stem from the same 
place as EU norms. However Putin stated that Russia had to “find our own path in order to build 
a democratic, free and just society and state,”39 making clear that while the Russian ‘path’ is 
different, it is equally legitimate. During the same speech Putin calls Russia “a major European 
power” and goes on to tie Russia to ‘European’ values. For Putin, “European culture, the ideals 
of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy have for many centuries been our society’s 
determining values.” These norms appear in part to mirror closely EU norms, yet Putin adds, 
“the democratic road we have chosen is independent in nature, a road along which we move 
ahead, all the while taking into account our own specific internal circumstances”. Here this 
demonstrates that Putin is seeking to both, provide legitimacy for Russian promoted norms in 
Europe, while also, making clear these norms are specific to Russia. Furthermore, Putin binds 
neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine, to Russia “through a common history… language ... 
and great culture”, implying that Russia could potentially have more legitimacy than other 
foreign policy actors to promote Russian norms within Ukraine. Putin is making clear that the 
EU does not have a monopoly on legitimate norms within the neighbourhood, and that Russian 
                                                
37 Nathalie Tocci, ed, ‘Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?: The European Union and its Global Partners’, Center for 
European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 2  
38 The Treaty on the European Union, Article 21, 13th December, 2007 [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN] <accessed 21st July 2017> 
39 ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, 25th April, 2005 
[http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931] <accessed 26th July 2017> 
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norms stem from the same roots at the EU norms. This can be seen as laying the foundation for 
the subsequent ‘normative battleground’ as both the EU and Russia have claimed legitimacy in 
their norm promotion, and both seek to promote these norms within Ukraine.  
 
1.3: Securitising Projects 
 
As has been established the EU and Russia, are norm promoters, and this thesis will argue that 
these actions form part of their securitising projects within Ukraine. Therefore, it is important to 
fully explain what these securitising projects are, and how they are formed. This thesis will argue 
that the norms being promoted by the EU and Russia stem from the distinct type of powers they 
are. Russia and the EU are promoting norms which originate from their different securitising 
projects, and the competing securitising projects can be framed within the ‘modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ foreign policy outlooks. However, it is important to note that the EU and Russian 
securitising projects do not always cleanly fall into these categories, as they would not cleanly 
fall into any. Yet, as Robert Cooper has explained, “thinking about foreign affairs, like any other 
kind of thinking, requires a conceptual map which, as maps do, simplifies the landscape and 
focuses on the main features.”40 This helps justify why it is helpful to see the securitising 
projects within this framework.  
 
1.3.1: A ‘Modern’ Outlook on Security   
 
The ‘modern’ state can be described as sitting in the “classical, traditional” state system, and is 
often traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which guaranteed each nation-state 
sovereignty over its own affairs. In the Westphalian age, foreign policy was characterized by 
states as the main actors, and there was a clear distinction between foreign and domestic 
politics.41 For Robert Cooper, ‘modern’ states “retain the monopoly of force and may be 
prepared to use it against each other”42. Important characteristics of the ‘modern’ order are the 
primacy of state sovereignty, and the refusal of external influence in ones’ domestic and foreign 
affairs. Cooper argued that “it is not that, in the modern order, might is right so much as that 
right is not particularly relevant; might and raison d’état are the things that matter.” This was an 
international order that was based on hegemony, on spheres of influence, on balance, and one 
where external borders could be changed using force. This is why behaving as a ‘modern’ power 
in today’s international system can be seen to be reverting to ‘rougher’ methods of a previous 
era: force, pre-emptive attack, and deception, principles that are characteristic of the “nineteenth 
                                                
40 Cooper, Robert, The Post-Modern State and the World Order, London: Demons, 1996, p. 8  
41 Rokas, Grajauskas, and Laurynas Kasčiūnas. "Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining 
EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement." Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 22 (2009): 80-98 p. 83 
42 Cooper, The Post Modern State, p. 19     
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century world of every state for itself.”43 Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas have argued that ‘modern’ 
states have been epitomised by concepts such as nationalism, the nation-state and sovereignty. 
 
The concept of sovereignty and the separation of domestic and foreign affairs are priorities for 
Russian politics today.44 Moscow operates within the great power school of IR, which assumes 
the inevitability of conflict, the supremacy of hard power, and the cynicism of others motives.45 
Russia’s world view, particularly the view of the European order as “a mixture of nostalgia for 
the time of the ‘concert of Europe’”46 where balance of power was key, is a fundamentally 
‘modern’ concept. This desire for a ‘concert’ has been labelled by Sten Rynning as a dangerous 
pursuit that could “herald the type of unrestrained or flexible balance of power politics that 
presaged the great wars of the twentieth century,”47 with the implication of Russia holding an 
outlook stemming from the previous era. Russia would argue that within the international 
system, “the best basis for [world] order would be for the great powers mutually to respect their 
spheres of influence and domestic political differences.”48 For Russia, the concepts epitomised 
by ‘modernism’ are keenly promoted, such as respect for the nation-state and sovereignty.   
 
1.3.2: A ‘Postmodern’ Outlook on Security  
 
‘Postmodernism’ as an intellectual movement came into existence after World War Two, as 
Western societies became increasingly disillusioned by the brutality of the two World Wars.49 
A ‘postmodern’ system can be charaterised as one seeking to establish a post-Westphalian order, 
where a state’s sovereignty is constrained through legal developments beyond the national 
state.50 In this post-Westphalian order, foreign policy can transcend states, and the state-centric 
idea of IR. Postmodernism accepts a wide spectre of foreign policy actors in addition to nation-
states, such as non-governmental, international and supranational organisations. A ‘postmodern’ 
actor uses cooperation instead of force to build security, and prefers soft power to any form of 
hard power. The concept of sovereignty and the principals of non-interference have been 
superseded by that of cooperation and the pooling of power.  Furthermore, as ‘postmodern’ 
powers place more focus on immaterial aspects of power, such as norms, the projection of norms 
can become as important as any other form of national interest. The characteristics of a 
                                                
43 Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, “Modern versus Postmodern”, p. 83  
44 Boris Mezhuyev, “Modern Russia and Postmodern Europe”, 2nd March, 2008, [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10362] 
<accessed 27th July 2017> 
45 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics”, May/June 2016, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-
04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics] <accessed May 16th 2017> 
46 Krastev, “Russia and the Post-Cold War European Order”,  
47 Sten Rynning, “The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary balance of power” in 
International Affairs, Vol, 91, No. 3, 2015, 539-552  p. 552   
48 Niall Ferguson, “The Russia Question”, December 2016, [http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/23/the-russian-question-putin-
trump-bush-obama-kissinger/] <accessed March 17th 2017> 
49 “Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, “Modern versus Postmodern”, p. 82 
50 Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, “Modern versus Postmodern”, p. 84  
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‘postmodern’ world can be identified as the breaking down of the distinction between domestic 
and foreign affairs, mutual interference, the rejection of force, the growing irrelevance of borders 
and security based on concepts such as transparency, openness and interdependence.51  
For Robert Cooper, the EU is the most developed example of a ‘postmodern’ system. The EU, 
Cooper claims, represents security through transparency, and transparency through 
interdependence.52 If ‘modern’ Europe was known to have been born with the Treaty of 
Westphalia, then ‘postmodern’ Europe derived from two treaties: The Treaty of Rome which was 
an attempt at moving beyond the nation state and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE Treaty) which aimed at restricting a build-up of military power. Ivan Krastev has also 
attributed a ‘postmodern’ outlook to the EU, arguing that it relies on mutual interference and 
security based on transparency and openness.53  The EU, as a ‘postmodern’ power, successfully 
blurs the distinction between foreign and domestic politics, enacts voluntary mutual intrusiveness 
and demonstrates a complete repudiation of the use of force in settling disputes.54 Furthermore, 
the EU has a desire to protect individuals, not solely to resolve security issues of states, which is 
an important aspect of a ‘postmodern’ outlook.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
51 Cooper, The Post-Modern State, pp. 22-30  
52 Cooper, The Post-Modern State, p. 30  
53 Mezhuyev, “Modern Russia and Postmodern Europe”,  
54 Grajauskas and Kasčiūnas, “Modern versus Postmodern”, p. 84 
55 Cooper, The Post-Modern State, p. 43 
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2: The Theoretical Framework: Introducing Barry Buzan 
 
As has been discussed, there are seen to be two separate, competing outlooks needing to be 
analysed within a theoretical framework that allows for these different outlooks. The EU and 
Russia are enacting securitising projects from different understandings of IR, from different 
‘spheres’ of IR. Contemporary IR has previously been labelled a “mixed bag of unrelated 
approaches which are usually not in dialogue”56. This highlights a core problem within IR: that 
theories do not allow for competing or different approaches to be applied concurrently. Adrian 
Gallagher wrote “IR is said to be detached from the complexities of a 21st century globalized 
world that demands students understand interconnected processes at the sub-national and 
international level.”57 Barry Buzan has attempted to overcome this criticism by developing an 
analytical framework based on three differing interpretations of IR: Hobbesian power politics, 
Grotian ideas of shared interests and incentives, and Kantian values and norms.58 Buzan, as part 
of the ‘English school’, rejects the view that paradigms in IR are incommensurable, and aimed to 
provide a tripartite framework for analysing IR. Buzan’s framework provides an opportunity to 
combine aspects of IR theory in order to provide a more holistic and thorough approach. 
Therefore Buzan’s approach can be seen as one providing a more effective framework as, as 
Andrew Linklater wrote, “there is more to international relations than the realist suggests but less 
than the cosmopolitan desires.”59 
 
2.1: Buzan’s “Three Spheres” 
 
This thesis will apply the approach advanced by Barry Buzan, who argues that the overarching 
idea of the English School is to synthesize different theories and concepts in order to provide a 
fuller understanding of the society of states. The basic aim is to understand and interpret the 
composition and dynamics of the social structure of international politics.60 In doing so, Buzan 
casts international theory into the “English School triad” of three spheres that operate 
simultaneously. These are called: 
 
- International System 
- International Society  
- World Society 
 
                                                
56 Robert W. Murray, “Introduction” in “System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International 
Relations” ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations, April 2013, p. 10    
57 Adrian Gallagher, “Look inside International Relations: she’s alright she’s alright” An overview of the English School’s 
engagement with human rights” in “System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations” ed. 
Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations,  April 2013, p.34 
58 Buzan, From International to World Society,  
59 Gallagher, “Look inside International Relations”, p. 36 
60 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 3   
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The first sphere is the ‘international system’ which takes a Hobbesian/Machiavellian 
understanding of power politics amongst states and broadly parallels the realism and neorealism 
theory.61 This sphere holds that states are engaged in an escalating struggle for power, just as 
“gladiators in an arena”.62 The ‘international system’ considers the principal actors to be states, 
acting in their own self-interest.  
The second sphere is ‘international society’, which stems from Grotian ideas of Rationalism and 
puts the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and shared norms, 
rules and institutions at the centre.63 Contrary to Hobbes, Grotius believed that states are not 
engaged in a simple power struggle, “like gladiators in an arena”, but are limited in their 
conflicts by common rules and institutions. However, this sphere still asserts that states are the 
principal actors in international politics. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson in 1984 wrote the classic 
definition for ‘international society’; “a group of states which not merely form a system, in the 
sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also 
have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their 
relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.”64 This sphere 
combines both the more material aspects of IR, with sharing a common identity, such as norms, 
beliefs, governance and even securitising methods. “International society” is often labelled the 
‘via media’ between the other two spheres. 
While ‘international society’ and the ‘international system’ are both focused upon states, the 
final sphere of the triad, ‘world society’, builds upon the ideas of Kant and the theory of 
Revolutionism. World society relates to shared values and identities; it takes individuals, non-
state organisations, and ultimately the global population as a whole, as the focus of global 
societal identities, and the ‘world society’ transcends state systems. 65 
 
The foundations of Russian securitising projects can largely be seen to fit within Buzans’ 
‘international system’ framework, the Hobbesian based sphere. Strobe Talbott wrote how “to 
understand Russia, think back instead to the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, 
who thought that the natural human condition is a “war of all against all”; that the security of a 
people depends on a strong, even authoritarian, state; and that successful states are those that 
strike the “posture of Gladiators” 66 For Talbott, Russia’s insistence on treating its neighbours as 
fitting within a “sphere of privileged interests” only further highlights the ties between Russia’s 
foreign outlook and a Hobbesian outlook. The core aspects of the ‘modern’ outlook attributed to 
                                                
61 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 7   
62 Maria Ileana Stanescu, “The English School of International Relations: A “Middle Way” Between Realism and Idealism”, 
Valahia University Press, 2011, [http://www.diacronia.ro/ro/indexing/details/A20433/pdf] <accessed 26th July 2017> p. 1 
63 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. xvii   
64 Barry Buzan, “The English School:An Underexploited Resource in IR” in Review of International Studies, Vol 27, No. 3, 
July 2001, pp. 471-488, abstract   
65 Murray, Introduction, p. 9 
66 Strobe Talbott, “Dangerous Leviathans: Russia’s Bad Philosophy”, 20th April, 2009, 
[https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/dangerous-leviathans-russias-bad-philosophy/] <accessed 2nd August 2017> 
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Russia, also fit largely within this ‘international system’ sphere; the primacy of state sovereignty, 
hegemony and balance, cynicism of others motives, being distrusting of the EU, and the primacy 
of the nation-state as a principal actor. 
The EU can be seen to fit largely within the Kantian ‘world society’ sphere. Kant has even been 
described as the “secular patron saint of today’s Europe.”67 In Kant’s writings he foresaw a 
‘Perpetual Peace’ based on democratic rule and a federation of like-minded states. Robert Kagan 
has declared that the EU “is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, 
the realization of Kants’ “Perpetual Peace”,68 further demonstrating the notion that the EU is 
largely a realisation of Buzan’s ‘world society’. Furthermore, ‘world society’ emphasises the 
individual over the state, and this wish to protect individuals, over the wish to resolve the 
security problems of nation states, “is a part of the post-modern ethos,”69 and is one shared by 
the EU.  
 
For this thesis, it was necessary to frame the analysis in a theory that allowed for the interaction 
of different political systems. One of the key advantages to the triad is its “middle-approach” to 
IR as it provides for different systems to operate and engage, for example, states such as Russia, 
and non-states, like the EU. For Barry Buzan, “the English school’s triad of spheres exactly 
captures the simultaneous existence of state and non-state systems operating alongside and 
through each other, without finding this conceptually problematic.”70 Buzan explained that the 
English School offered “an escape from the Westphalian straightjacket”71 by providing the 
framework for differentiation and comparisons among different types of international society. 
 
The theoretical framework of the English School triad, specifically the ‘international system’ and 
‘world society’ spheres, will be applied to the securitizing projects of Russia and the EU. 
As this thesis is analysing competing outlooks on IR, it therefore requires a theory that will allow 
for this type of pluralist approach. The English School triad allows for different theoretical 
systems to be applied simultaneously and believes that this works to form “a complete and 
interlinked picture of the IR universe”. 72 A distinctive feature of the English School is that it 
allows for multiple spheres and this is what generates its theoretical pluralism.73 Richard Little 
has added that the English School manages to transcend the ‘inter-paradigm debate’ which 
argues that realist, liberal and Marxist approaches to IR theory are incommensurable. For clarity, 
academics like to see things in isolation, but in reality, differing systems exist simultaneously, 
for example, Hobbesian and Kantian systems can exist together within one larger system. The 
                                                
67 Talbott, “Dangerous Leviathans”,  
68 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness” in A Different Kind of Power?, ed. Thomas Diez, New York: The International 
Debate Education Association, 2014 p. 77   
69 Cooper, The Post-Modern State, p, 43  
70 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 23 
71 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 4   
72 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 9 
73 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 10 
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English School triad allows us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of the multifaceted 
international system. 
 
Crucially, the English School triad is able to focus on individuals, norms, and values alongside 
realism, and does so without rejecting the primacy or necessity of the state in global affairs,74 
demonstrating how it is also applicable to Russia. Buzan also elaborated on ‘world society’ and 
called it “the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level but transcending the state.”75 
This can be applied to the EU as they seek to promote norms beyond the borders of the EU, and 
the idea behind the EU itself is one which transcends state boundaries. This thesis will chart the 
interaction, and subsequent clash of these securitising methods, and the English School approach 
allows for these distinct spheres to “blur into each other at the boundaries.”76  
 
However, a core criticism of this theoretical framework is whether the English School is really a 
theory at all. The question of what counts as a theory is controversial. Dave C. Copeland wrote 
how the English School is less a theory, than a vague approach to thinking about and 
conceptualizing world politics.77 In the American tradition, a theory should contain and explain, 
or at least be able to generate, a testable hypothesis of a causal nature.78 Robert W. Murray has 
argued that all legitimate theories must stand up to testing in order for them to be taken 
seriously.79 While the English School does not do this, it does however organize a field 
systematically, structure questions and establish coherently a set of interrelated concepts. This 
approach is far more suited to this research as there is no such hypothesis, and the research 
requires a framework that would allow for interrelated concepts.  
 
As Barry Buzan argues, if the English School is presented, not as a normative theory, but as a 
theory about norms, then there is potential to close this gap. Buzan goes on to add that “English 
School thinking has as much of a claim to theory as Alexander Wendt’s attempt to pose 
constructivism as a social theory of international politics.”80 The English School provides 
benchmarks for the evaluation of significant change within international orders, it sets out a 
taxonomy that enables us to make clear comparisons across time and space, and can provide 
some predictions and explanations of outcome. Furthermore, the English School provides a solid 
                                                
74 Robert W. Murray, “Introduction” in “System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International 
Relations” ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations: April 2013, p. 10 
75 Cornelia Navari, “World Society and English School Methods” in “System, Society & the World: Exploring the English 
School of International Relations” ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations, April 2013, p. 16 
76 Barry Buzan, “The English School:An Underexploited Resource in IR” in Review of International Studies, Vol 27, No. 3, 
July 2001, pp. 471-488,  p. 476 
77 Dale C. Copeland, “A Realist Critique of the English School” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2009, pp. 
427-441, p. 427   
78 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 24 
79 Robert W. Murray, “The Need for an English School Research Program” in “System, Society & the World: Exploring the 
English School of International Relations” ed. Robert W. Murray, Bristol: e-International Relations, April 2013, p. 69 
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theoretical framework that provides scholars with a coherent set of tools with which to analyse 
IR, and allows for exploration of interactions between seemingly contradictory pre-existing 
theories. 
 
This issue is said to be compounded by the School’s adherents lack of desire in operating 
according to a set of defined methodological rules.81 This forms part of the problem when testing 
the school as a theory ‘in the social science tradition’ as it lacks a concern with methods and a 
clear framework, in order to determine whether an English School approach was being used. 
Murray has claimed the English School lacks a coherent theoretical lens, and Buzan agrees that 
there is a lack of clarity setting out exactly what is entailed in the theoretical pluralism that 
underpins the theory.82 While Buzan accepts that it is necessary for the theory to develop one, 
this criticism has also been painted as a strength. Richard Little claims that there are in fact three 
distinct ways to consider the theory.83 Firstly; “as a set of ideas found in the minds of statesmen, 
secondly; as a set of ideas found in the minds of political scientists,; thirdly. as a set of externally 
imposed concepts that define the material and social structures of the international system. This 
methodological openness could work to open up the possibilities of the English School. For this 
research, this lack of clearly defined methodological rules worked in its favour, allowing this 
research to take on a broad process tracing approach in order to trace the development of the 
‘normative battleground’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
81 Murray, “The Need for an English School Research Program”, p. 69 
82 Buzan, From International to World Society, p. 22 
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3: Conceptualisation of the “Normative Battleground” 
 
3.1:  The Norms promoted through the EU and Russia’s ‘Securitising Projects’  
 
For the EU, its norm promotion in the eastern neighbourhood, and specifically Ukraine, 
constitutes an extension of its internal project.84 This project is based primarily on EU norms and 
values which are placed at the forefront of its policy concerns, and largely shape all of what the 
EU is and does. The EU’s normative agenda, according to Ian Manners, centres around five core 
norms, which are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights.85 While also 
containing four ‘minor norms’ of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development 
and good governance. These norms can be characterised as being largely ‘postmodern’ in the 
sense that they are also promoting the individual ahead of the state, demonstrated by the 
emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion. Furthermore, these norms fit into the 
‘world society’, Kantian sphere of Buzan’s ‘triad’, in that Kant foresaw a peaceful society based 
on democratic rule, one which the EU is promoting norms, such as democracy, in order to 
achieve.  
 
Russia is promoting the more ‘modern’ norms as their core norms. Russia claims to privilege 
sovereignty, regime stability, non-interference in internal affairs of states, alongside a gradual 
evolution of governance, as a means of managing its unstable environment.”86 These Russian 
norms can be classified as ‘modern’ as the focus on state sovereignty can be traced back to the 
Treaty of Westphalia discussed earlier, which defined the ‘modern’ system. In addition, the non-
interference in the internal affairs of states would imply that nation-states are the legitimate 
actors in international affairs, not supranational organisations which could require some level of 
interference. These norms can stand in almost direct contrast to the ‘postmodern’ norms being 
promoted by the EU. For example, the norm of regime stability as the EU’s focus on developing 
good governance as a norm could be seen as undermining Russia’s promotion of regime 
stability.  
 
Interestingly, both powers claim to adhere to the United Nations (UN) backed norms in the 
international arena. These norms consist of such as respect for sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes.87 The EU has consistently 
pursued and applied these principles, whilst also acting as a ‘postmodern’ power, despite on the 
surface these norms appearing to adhere to a more ‘modern’ outlook. Richard Sakwa has 
explained that the UN norms such as “the respect for sovereignty, and territorial integrity, non-
interference in internal affairs of states, indivisibility of security, human rights and freedoms, are 
                                                
84 Derek Averre, “Competing Rationalities’’, p. 1693 
85 Romanova, “Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power”, p. 373  
86 Derek Averre, “Competing Rationalities’, p. 1696 
87 ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 11th December, 2008, 
[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf] <accessed 27th July 2017> 
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in line with ‘Russia’s definition of a great power’”.88 Russia is promoting these norms, not 
merely due to their status as UN backed norms, but also because they allow Russia to gain a 
sense of international legitimacy, and to rebuild their status. In Russia’s eyes, the UN is a 
legitimate international actor, and the EU is not. Russia is using these norms, as UN backed 
norms, in order to legitimise its use of ‘modern’ norms in the twenty first century.  
 
3.2: Methods of Norm Promotion  
 
3.2.1: EU Norm Promotion 
 
The EU has a carefully crafted method for promoting norms, as an established normative foreign 
policy actor, and is experienced with the use of soft power, particularly political conditionality. 
Political conditionality is said to be “at the heart of the EU’s promotion of its political 
organisation, norms, rules and regulations beyond its territory, known as “Europeanisation.”89 
This principle of political conditionality is a fundamental aspect of the EU’s norm promotion 
within its neighbouring states.  
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), conceived in 2003, implemented in 2004, has been 
seen as the overarching policy for norm promotion in the EU’s eastern and southern 
neighbourhoods. The objective of the ENP was to ensure stability, security and well-being within 
neighbouring countries.90 The ENP was established as an alternative to EU membership but 
would allow the EU to “employ its political and economic weight by turning to either coercive or 
negative, i.e. punishment, such as sanctions, or positive, i.e. rewards such as more favourable 
trade relations, conditionality.”91 Norm promotion was to form a core aspect of the ENP and in 
order to meet the goals of the ENP there would be jointly agreed Action Plans based on a 
commitment to shared norms and values. “Most of the ENP Action Plans established with the 
Eastern Neighbours underlined the need for a reinforcement of democratic institutions, including 
new electoral laws, reform of the judiciary and ratification of international Human Rights 
covenants, among others.”92 
 
By 2008 the ENP was widely perceived to need a reboot and a new initiative was established 
within the ENP framework: the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Ukraine was one of six partner 
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countries included in this new partnership. Since its implementation in 2009, the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) has represented the eastern dimension of the ENP and is based on instilling EU 
norms in neighbouring countries, such as, liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the 
rule of law.93 The framework of the EaP “promoted specific thematic ‘policy platforms’ on 
democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration, energy security and contacts 
between people.”94 The reforms to instil these norms would be agreed through Association 
Agreements (AA) of the EaP and they have been labelled as the EU’s main instrument bringing 
the partner countries “closer to EU norms and standards.95 
 
In addition, in 2011, Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and Stefan Fule, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
Policy, re-launched the ENP with a renewed focus on engagement with its neighbours. Part of 
this revitalised proposal was the ‘more for more’ principle which offers ‘more funds for more 
reforms’ within the EU neighbourhood.96 In short, financial incentives for adopting more EU 
promoted norms. A European Commission memo published in 2013 laid out how the EU 
reviewed the ENP in 2010-2011 and put a strong focus on promoting deep and sustainable 
democracy.97 The memo also discussed the EU’s ‘more for more’ principle through which the 
EU will develop stronger partnerships with neighbours who make ‘more’ progress with reforms.  
 
3.2.2. Russian norm promotion  
 
The Russian approach to norm promotion is less structured than the EU approach and Russia has 
leant about the high stakes of normative influence in the region from encountering the EU’s 
“normative power”98. As a result, Russia has developed an “alternative normative concept” to 
challenge the universality of the concept the EU is promoting.99 Russia does not want Ukraine to 
fall under the EU liberal security order based on the norms the EU promotes. Therefore, Russia 
seeks to counter the EU norms being promoted within the neighbourhood. Makarychev has also 
promoted this idea and has labelled Russia as more of a “norm-exploiter” than a “norm 
producer”.100 Tatiana Romanova has discussed how Russia when addressing, specifically, the 
norm of human rights being promoted by the EU in its neighbourhood, has “moved from a 
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defensive to an offensive strategy”.101 This implies a change in norm promotion over time, 
meaning there are two forms of promotion we can identify. Russia promotes norms both in 
defence of EU norms, and offensively to actively counter EU norms.  
 
Russia can be seen to be promoting norms defensively, in reaction to the EU norms it seeks to 
counter. This is done largely through criticising EU norms and EU norm implementation, and 
promoting alternatives. Some of the Russian criticism of the normative interference of the EU in 
Ukraine in 2004 was not an explicit promotion of a Russian norm, yet in directly opposing and 
criticising the norms the EU was promoting, this was a way of undercutting EU norms and 
thereby, in a sense, promoting the opposing norm. For example, in complaining that the EU was 
undermining Ukrainian sovereignty with interference during the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’, 
Russia was advocating to respect the sovereignty of states, a core ‘modern’ Russian norm. 
  
Russian norms promoted also sought to counterbalance the growing influence and presence of 
the EU and its norms, particularly within its neighbourhood and security.102 For example, in 
2008, Russian President Medvedev suggested the current European security architecture was 
inadequate and proposed a new system.103 Medvedev suggested that a key issue was that 
European security continued to be “overly ideologised”, which as Samuel Layton states, refers to 
the “conflation of normative and democracy related arguments relating to security”, and the view 
from Russia that security decisions should not be based on evaluations of a country’s level of 
democracy. In this respect, “Russia sought to reframe security principles in the Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian space away from such Western notions of democracy and ideology” In sum, Russia was 
attempting to reframe European security away from any form of norm promotion or compliance. 
Even though the proposal wasn’t adopted, this is still an example of action taken by Russia to 
counter what it viewed as EU dominance over norm promotion.  
 
One way Russia tried to counter the perceived monopoly on EU norms, and therefore to be able 
to promote its own norms, was to ensure the EU couldn’t claim the monopoly on legitimate 
norms being promoted. In this sense, Russian norm promotion became almost assertive. During a 
2007 speech in Munich, Putin spoke of how Russia is “constantly being taught about democracy. 
But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.”104  
Putin also added that “we are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of 
international law,” implying that Russia is a legitimate power who upholds and respects these 
basic principles. As Tatiana Romanova has discussed, from this stage, in 2007, there was a 
notion of competition over norms and values and there was a clear understanding by Russia that 
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it needed to critique the EU and have its own alternative concept to promote.105 This approach of 
norm promotion fits with the Russian goal of rebuilding its ‘great power’ position in 
international society as critiquing EU norms is not enough, but promoting alternative, legitimate 
norms would be the way.  
 
3.3: The Formation of the “Normative Battleground”  
 
This entire chapter has been laying the foundations for the conceptualisation of the ‘normative 
battleground’ that will be analysed as developing between the EU and Russia in Ukraine. The 
‘normative battleground’ stems from the conflicting securitising projects promoted by the EU 
and Russia, classified earlier as ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’, and these securitising projects can 
be seen through the norms each power choses to promote. These ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ 
outlooks can be framed with Buzan’s ‘triad’ allowing for a Hobbesian and Kantian interpretation 
of these norm promoting projects. For example, Russia, coming from a ‘modern’/Hobbesian 
approach to securitising, seeks to promote respect sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference within Ukraine as their view of what is legitimate in the international arena. 
Whereas the EU, seeking to promote a ‘postmodern’/Kantian approach to securitising, is 
promoting norms such as mutual interference, democracy promotion, and pooling sovereignty.  
 
It is clear that these norms cannot be promoted within the same space at the same time, and yet 
this is what occurs in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014. The ‘normative battleground’ which the 
following empirical sections seeks to outline and develop, stems from these opposing 
securitising projects promoting incompatible norms within Ukraine.  
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4: Reviewing the ‘Modern’ and ‘Postmodern’ Debate  
 
This thesis will frame the securitising projects of the EU and Russia into ‘postmodern’ and 
‘modern’ categories respectively. However, this is the subject of much academic debate, with 
regards to what extent these terms are wholly appropriate, and even, necessary, as Andrew 
Wilson has pointed out. Wilson claims that some have said western Europe has become more 
‘postmodern’, “whatever that meant.”106 In countering the classification of this thesis, Robert 
Cooper has argued that Russia cannot be classified as a ‘modern’ power. Cooper made the point 
that Russia’s behaviour is not entirely ‘modern’, claiming that “there are also postmodern 
elements in Russia trying to get out”.107 Cooper draws on the example of the acceptance of 
OSCE observers in Chechnya by Russia, and their acceptance of the CFE Treaty. However, 
while Cooper was correct in 1996, at the time of writing, Russia chose to suspend its 
participation in the CFE Treaty in 2007.108 As the CFE Treaty encouraged openness and 
transparency, Russia’s withdrawal can indeed be seen as reverting to a more ‘modern’ stance. 
Furthermore, academic, Andrew Wilson discussed how Dmitri Trenin, Head of the Moscow 
Carnegie Centre, has inverted Cooper’s perspective of the 21st century international system as 
being ‘postmodern’, and claimed that there are members of the EU, such as the United Kingdom 
and France, that still “possess elements of both”, meaning elements of both hard power ability 
from the 19th century, and soft power ability from the 21st.109 Europe, argues Trenin, is not 
located within a 21st century world, as Cooper has asserted, and instead argues that there are still 
aspects of the more ‘modern’ world within Europe. 
 On the other side of the discussion, Richard Sakwa has argued that while Putin is deeply 
committed to a “new realism”, it has “rejected much of the zero-sum logic of traditional views of 
international politics”.110 This implies that Russia is not adhering to the traditional ‘modern’ 
outlook which has the zero-sum mentality at its foundations. Sakwa has further argued that the 
EU’s normative agenda is “vitiated by the geopolitical aspirations of the new Atlanticism to 
extend its zone of influence to the east.”111 Implying that the EU also hosts some aspects of 
‘modern’ behaviour in its foreign policy outlook. A more nuanced understanding of the ‘modern’ 
and ‘postmodern’ debate has been given by Andrew Wilson who has argued that the EU is 
actually “a mixture of postmodern factors and old nation state traditions,”112 and that Russia 
“also mixes up the traditional and the postmodern, but in a different way.” This thesis 
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acknowledges this debate, but this research seeks to draw upon the ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ 
aspects of the securitising projects, not claiming that the securitising projects solely and entirely 
sit within the outlooks, and acknowledges that in reality the situation is largely more complicated 
than this. The ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ framework is applied to help provide an outline to 
understand the EU and Russia’s securitising outlooks.  
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5: Methodology  
 
The aim of this research has been to provide a full conceptualisation for, and trace the 
development of, a ‘normative battleground’ occurring between the EU and Russia within 
Ukraine. To trace the development of a ‘normative battleground’ this thesis will analyse three 
critical junctures during a ten-year period in Ukraine, looking at 2004,2009 and 2014. In order to 
trace this development, this thesis will apply process tracing as its methodology.  
 
This research can be broken down into two research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: To what extent can the different securitising outlooks be seen to shape the 
norms promoted by the EU and Russia? 
 
Research Question 2: How have the corresponding norms lead to the development of a 
‘normative battleground’ between the EU and Russia?  
 
This thesis will be using process tracing as its methodology. Process tracing has been defined as 
“the analysis of evidence of processes, sequences and conjunctures of events within a case for 
the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might 
actually explain the case.”113 Through this method we are able to identify the intervening causal 
process or causal mechanism between an independent variable and the dependent variable. 
Without applying process tracing to a chain of events to uncover the causal mechanisms, it 
would merely be a narrative, and without applying the events it would merely be a theoretical 
study. Process tracing is a way of braiding together factors and events with mechanisms.114 
Process tracing also allows for an in-depth study of a case,115 which in the case of this thesis, is 
the development of a ‘normative battleground’ within Ukraine.  
 
There are three types of process tracing it is possible to employ: theory-testing, theory-building 
and explaining-outcome.116 This thesis will use the explaining-outcome type of process tracing 
as this type produces a result that is only applicable to the one relevant case being investigated, 
and cannot be generalised and applied to other cases. The conceptualisation and application of 
the “normative battleground” will be specific to the events in Ukraine during the 2004-2014 
period. 
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For a successful process tracing, it must include several factors. It must include the effect which 
is under investigation; in this case, that is the development of the ‘normative battleground’. It 
must include a hypothesised cause; in this case is the two conflicting securitising projects 
stemming from the diverging ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ security outlooks. Also there must be 
processes or events that link the hypothesised cause with the effect; in this case the norms that 
are being promoted and leading to the ‘normative battleground’ that stem from the conflicting 
securitising projects. With process tracing, the focus is not merely on what happened, but how 
something happened. That means with this research, using process tracing will enable us to 
identify how the ‘normative battleground’ has developed, not merely that it indeed has.  
This thesis will use a combination of sources to build the empirical research. As process tracing 
takes a holistic approach to explaining outcomes, and brings together events, with factors and 
mechanisms, a wide variety of sources is necessary. This thesis will use a combination of 
speeches, interviews, foreign policy documents, policy papers, statements and newspaper articles 
in order to build this complete image of the events.  
 
Ukraine was selected as a case study through which to analyse the development of the 
‘normative battleground’ as it is a key neighbouring state for both the EU and Russia. For EU 
member states such as Poland, keeping Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit through active EU norm 
promotion was the only way of protecting the EU’s, and Poland’s, borders. 117 Ukraine is 
significant to the EU for many reasons, such as energy security, the need for Ukraine as a 
neighbour to have political stability, and for overall EU security. An unstable Ukraine could pose 
a significant security threat for the EU and its member states. Therefore, Ukraine remains a core 
part of the EU’s norm promotion to ensure security in the region, part of its ‘postmodern’ 
securitising project.  In addition, for Russian President Putin personally, “Ukraine lies east of the 
line that marks the extent of Western civilisation in Europe.”118 Much has been written about the 
Russian desire to reclaim great power status within the international arena and Russia recognises 
that “Ukraine is the key to its plans.”119 In this respect, it is possible to point to Ukraine as being 
important to Russia in maintaining their international prestige, and developing its international 
image as a ‘great power’, therefore marking Ukraine as an important place to prevent overt EU 
influence. Ukraine can be classified as being vital for the stability of the European continent as a 
whole, and a country over which influence is challenged.  
 
The critical junctures that have been selected as key points to analyse the development of the 
‘normative battleground’ are 2004, 2009 and 2014. These dates have been selected as, through 
the conceptualisation of the ‘battleground’, it became clear that Russian norm promotion was 
largely reacting to EU normative promotion in Ukraine, and the EU attempts at securitising 
within a ‘postmodern’ outlook within Ukraine. Therefore, the critical junctures chosen 
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correspond to key events and developments in EU norm promotion that Russia reacted to. These 
are:  
 
2004: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine 
2009: The implementation of the Eastern Partnership 
2014: The height of the fallout over the non-signature of the Association Agreement in 2013  
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6: Tracing the Development of the “Normative Battleground”  
 
This study will begin in 2004, a critical juncture for Russia-EU relations with regards to Ukraine. 
This empirical research will span 10 years, beginning with the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004, and 
culminating with Euromaidan protests in 2014. The aim is to trace the development of a 
‘normative battleground’ between the EU and Russia during this period, and to analyse how the 
securitising projects being implemented have shaped the norms being promoted.  
This analysis will begin with a brief description of events at this time to lay the groundwork, an 
analysis of the securitising projects framing the norms that are projected, and the subsequent 
development of the ‘normative battleground’. 
 
6.1: 2004: The Dawn of the “Normative Battleground”   
 
The main factor shaping EU-Russian relations towards the end of 2004, was the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ in Ukraine. This powerful civic movement began on 22nd November and “set a 
major new landmark in the post-communist history of eastern Europe, a seismic shift westward 
in the geopolitics of the region.”120 The ‘Orange Revolution’ was a series of protests against the 
2004 Ukrainian presidential election results. One candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, was strongly 
supported by outgoing President Kuchma and Russian President Putin. In opposition, stood the 
western leaning Viktor Yushchenko, who ran on an anti-corruption platform. The election was 
marred in fraud and irregularities after Yanukovych declared victory, and this led to two weeks 
of mass protests which brought the country to the brink of civil war. The mood of the revolution 
can be summed up with the lyrics of the 2004 winning Ukrainian Eurovision entry, “no 
falsifications, no lies, no machinations. Yes Yushchenko! Yes Yushchenko! This is our 
president!”121 In December, the Supreme Court of Ukraine declared the election invalid and 
subsequently Yushchenko defeated Yanukovych and was inaugurated in January 2005.  
The Orange Revolution is this thesis’ starting point as during this time it became clear that the 
EU was actively seeking to instil EU norms within Ukraine as a way of extending EU security 
into the neighbourhood. Furthermore, Russia’s involvement in the election campaign highlighted 
their desire to counter the EU’s influence, and to keep Ukraine within a Russian sphere of 
influence.  
 
6.1.1: The EU’s Securitising Project in 2004 
 
For the EU, the key securitising project being projected into Ukraine was the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The recent ‘big bang’ enlargement meant the EU borders had 
shifted east and moved the EU geographically closer to Ukraine. The objective of the ENP was 
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to ensure stability, security and well-being within the neighbouring countries,122 and to prevent 
the emergence of new ‘dividing lines’ within Europe by allowing EU neighbours to “share 
everything with the Union but institutions.”123 The European Neighbourhood Strategy explained 
that the ENP was necessary to help realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy 
released in 2003. 124 This paper had been the EU’s first security strategy, “A Secure Europe in a 
Better World,” and the document laid out the key threats faced by the EU and its strategic 
objectives in order to defend its security and promote its values; two concepts it appears are 
inextricably linked. For example, one of the key strategic objectives was “Building Security in 
our Neighbourhood” which argued “the best protection for our security is a world of well-
governed democratic states”125. In order to meet the goals of the ENP there would be jointly 
agreed Action Plans based on a commitment to shared norms and values. The EU deems the 
spread of good governance, the support of social and political reform, countering corruption and 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are “the best means of 
strengthening the international order.”  
This securitising measure forms part of the EU’s “postmodern” identity, demonstrated further by 
factors such as the growing irrelevance of borders, security based on cooperation and openness, 
interference within domestic affairs, contained within the ENP. The norms that formed a core 
part of this securitising project are the promotion of interdependence, with sovereignty no longer 
being absolute and democracy promotion. Buzan’s “world society” sphere, of a Kantian 
‘perpetual peace’ from the cooperation of a group of likeminded states, based on the spread of 
democracy, can encompass the EU’s securitising project here. The norms the EU are promoting 
are also norms from the internal EU project, so demonstrating the breaking down of domestic 
and foreign policy borders.   
 
6.1.2: Russia’s Securitising Project in 2004  
 
The period between 2003 and 2005 saw a “decoupling” of Russia’s Foreign Policy from the 
West, and a move towards pursuing its own self-interest, a move which had “major implications 
for Russian security and defence policy.”126 During the 2004 Annual Address to the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation, Putin spoke of how for the first time in a long time, Russia 
was economically and politically stable, which had had a beneficial effect on Russia’s 
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international position.127 In analysing the factors of Russia’s securitising project within Ukraine 
at this stage, it is not as simple to identify as the EU’s securitising project. The last National 
Security Concept had been published in 2000, and much had changed since this point. However, 
there are certain aspects that were still relevant. For example, the concept stated that 
“internationally, threats to Russian national security are manifested in attempts by other states to 
counteract its strengthening as one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world, to hinder 
realization of its national interests and to weaken its positions in Europe.”128 Therefore, Russia 
was seeking to counter any attempts at lessening its influence in Europe, and in this case, 
particularly in Ukraine.  This is further demonstrated with a speech by Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Lavrov, in 2004 where he declared that the situation on the territory of the former USSR 
provided an example of “the new threats and challenges which require a new level of 
understanding, trust and respect for the legitimate interests of each other,”129 and demonstrated 
the strongly held belief that Ukraine sits in Russia’s sphere of “vital interests” when he said the 
territory of the former USSR is a “a sphere of vital interests prompted by its entire history.” 
Lavrov also defined what was meant by “vital interests” saying “we are talking about respect of 
the legitimate concerns of each other about the issues of security.” Therefore, it can be 
established that Ukraine staying within Russia’s sphere of influence is a matter of security for the 
Russian state. In a second speech, Lavrov explained that “Russia, as nobody else, has done a 
great deal for these countries to become truly independent and sovereign.” 130  
 
This Russian desire to maintain Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty can be interpreted here 
as keeping Ukraine independent from the EU’s influence, a direct security threat. In doing so, 
Russia promoted norms stemming from this securitising project, in order to counter the 
implementation of EU norms within Ukraine. Norms such as, natural progression of political 
systems, rather than the EU implementation of democracy, respect for absolute sovereignty, non-
interference. These norms stem from Russia’s ‘modern” interpretation of international society, 
and can be traced back to Buzan’s ‘international system’ sphere, with its emphasis on 
sovereignty, balance, and spheres of influence. These norms form part of Russia’s international 
outlook, and almost diametrically oppose EU promoted norms, this here is forming the 
development of the ‘normative battleground’.  
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6.1.3: The ‘Normative Battleground’ 
 
Sovereignty or Interference?  
  
The EU promotes the pooling of sovereignty amongst member states and neighbouring states, 
such as Ukraine, for the security of the Union. The president of the European Commission, 
Romano Prodi, speaking in April 2004 from the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow, when discussing 
the European Security and Defence Policy, explained that “in these areas, the Member States of 
the Union have chosen to pool some of their sovereignty to deal with common problems more 
effectively and face up to our growing global responsibilities.”131 Furthermore, Prodi added, this 
“sovereignty pooling” has moved beyond the Union’s borders as a securitising measure. For 
Prodi growing interdependence has meant that the issues of security within the EU “no longer 
stop at borders.” In a separate speech in April 2004, Prodi spoke of the future of the EU and said 
“one option is to continue to put our trust in a system of international relations based on the 
balance of power and rely on the sovereignty and national interests of individual nation-states,” 
and yet that would be like "tackling the challenges of the 21st Century with the instruments and 
policies of the 19th".132 An approach based on these “modern” policies would be contrary to the 
very nature of the EU as a union based upon “dialogue, solidarity, multilateralism and an ethical 
dimension to politics.” Here, the EU is making clear their stance on the importance of pooling 
sovereignty for security, and how using a ‘19th century approach’, as a byword for a ‘modern’ 
approach, is in direct opposition to the EU approach.   
 
This ‘postmodern’ stance on sovereignty is demonstrated during the ‘Orange Revolution’. The 
EU clearly stated that they played a decisive role in the development of events. With direct 
reference to the Orange Revolution, Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner for External 
Relations and ENP in April 2005, while acknowledging the pivotal role of the Ukrainian people 
in the revolution, went on to add that “we practitioners of international politics know that major 
changes in the political cosmos are invariably due to a coincidence of factors. In this case, an 
important factor was the European Union and its new initiative, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy.”133 Ferrero-Waldner stated that “I believe that the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy played a 
significant role in the outcome of the Orange Revolution.” For Ferrero-Waldner, the EU 
contributed to the events in Ukraine, not by merely being an attractive ‘club’, as that would 
imply the EU’s role was purely passive, but with active involvement. The EU made clear to 
Ukraine that they would only offer a supportive partnership and a closer relationship “if Ukraine 
shared our fundamental values, and that Ukraine needed to demonstrate its commitment to 
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democratic principles and respect for the rule of law. This is an example of the EU using its 
influence to enact change and encourage reform within Ukraine, an example of the EU’s stance 
on pooling sovereignty and encouragement of interference within domestic affairs. 
 
In direct contrast, for Russia sovereignty is seen as a privileged norm and Russia vocally rejected 
the EU’s ‘interference’ within Ukraine. Lavrov stressed the importance of not meddling in the 
internal affairs of Ukraine and “to allow the Ukrainians to solve this problem themselves.”134 In 
an interview in November 2004 discussing the situation in Ukraine, Lavrov was asked to what 
extent the EU influenced the ongoing situation. Lavrov responded “everybody should avoid any 
incitement and take up firmly the position that Russia has held from the very beginning and 
which is that the Ukrainian people alone, on the basis of their laws, have the right to decide their 
future.”135 Here Lavrov was openly criticising interference within Ukraine from external 
influences, quite likely directed in part at the EU. Lavrov was asked if there remained any 
differences between Moscow and the West as to how to resolve the crisis in Ukraine and Lavrov 
responded “We are convinced that Ukraine alone will be able to select its foreign policy 
priorities and, based on the exercise of its sovereign rights, develop its international relations.” 136 
Russia claimed that Ukrainian has a sovereign right to make its own decisions, and therefore 
Russia is promoting sovereignty within Ukraine.  
 
However, in reality, Russia’s interpretation of ‘sovereignty’ is far more complex than it would 
first appear. Prioritising sovereignty as a ‘modern’ power would imply a lack of interference 
within a neighbouring country’s internal affairs, however this was not the case. Putin visited 
Ukraine twice during the election campaign to back Mr Yanukovych, who was standing for 
deepening ties with Russia, in direct contrast to Mr Yushchenko who presented himself as a pro-
Western reformer.137 The EU criticised Putin for “interfering in the discredited Ukrainian 
poll,”138 almost entirely mimicking Russian criticism of EU interference within Ukraine. The EU 
Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso, registered annoyance with Russia’s role in Ukraine 
during this period. Barroso accused Russia of sending advisers to aid Yanukovych’s campaign, 
and that stated that Putin repeatedly praised Yanukovych.  
Academic, Ruth Deyermond, has written on the concept of sovereignty within Russian foreign 
policy and claims Russia has a dual approach to state sovereignty. Deyermond explains how 
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Russia has a Westphalian model of sovereignty for outside the former Soviet region, and a 
separate post-Soviet model for inside it.139 As a ‘post-Soviet’ state, Ukraine would fall under a 
different interpretation of state sovereignty to other states. It appears that for Ukraine, the issue 
of sovereignty is closely tied with Russian sovereignty, that is, protecting Russian and Russia’s 
neighbourhood from EU interference. Furthermore, Deyermond points out that the shifts in 
Russia’s interpretations of sovereignty can be traced to the development of the liberal order with 
its rejection of the primacy of state sovereignty over the rights of the individual, the 
responsibility of the state to the individual and the responsibility of an international community 
of states to the individual, even, if necessary, without that states’ consent. This concept of 
sovereignty can be closely tied to the ‘postmodern’ outlook and ‘world society’ sphere that the 
EU interprets sovereignty from within, with the emphasis on the rights of the individual over the 
state. It is partly this challenge to the primacy of the state’s sovereignty that Russia is clashing 
with the EU. The Russian worldview rests on the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, that is the 
sovereignty of the state, not with the individual.  
 
Democracy or Regime Stability? 
 
The EU’s stance on sovereignty, as placing emphasis on the rights of the individual over the 
state, can also be seen in their approach to democracy and democracy promotion. As part of the 
EU’s securitising measures, they were actively promoting democracy and democratic reforms in 
Ukraine in 2004. Prodi, speaking in April, said how “we have already accomplished a lot in 
fostering democratic principles through development assistance, which has helped bolster peace 
and security internationally.”140 The EU’s role in democracy promotion is described as “second 
to none” in Ukraine. Furthermore, Prodi spoke of how the EU is the “first example of a 
democracy that goes beyond national borders.” A core aim of the ENP was democracy 
promotion within the neighbouring countries, and Janez Porocnik, member of the European 
Commission, made clear that the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections would need to comply 
with democratic standards for the EU-Ukraine relationship to progress.141  
 
This support for democratic reform and active democracy promotion can be seen in the EU’s 
actions during the Orange Revolution. Following the claims of illegitimate interference and fraud 
in the 2004 presidential elections, the EU refused to accept the election results, as this 
undermined the democratic process. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, of the European Commission, said 
that “in the light of reports of serious and systematic irregularities from the OSCE election 
observation mission, it is clear that the official published results do not reflect the will of the 
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Ukrainian voters. The EU cannot therefore accept the election results.”142 Ferrero-Waldner added 
that the Ukrainian parliament had voted overwhelmingly on the same position, providing further 
legitimacy in rejecting the results. Furthermore, the EU supported the protestors of the Orange 
Revolution. The European Parliament adopted a resolution saying “it strongly condemns” the 
conditions under which the elections took place and “expressed its solidarity with the Ukrainian 
people” who were demonstrating in the streets.143 Here this demonstrates the EU’s preference for 
democracy, and their insistence on legitimate democratic procedures. The support for the 
protestors also highlights the EU’s support for the rights of the people against the state if 
democratic rights are not adhered to. This is an example of the EU demonstrating an 
overwhelming desire for a legitimate democracy over short term stability within Ukraine.  
 
In contrast, Russia prioritised regime stability within Ukraine over the rights of the protestors to 
protest the election fraud. While Russia did make reference to the importance of respecting the 
will of the people and the importance of the democratic process, Lavrov placed a greater 
emphasis on decisions being taken “on the basis on their laws and Constitution”144 Putin, when 
asked about the situation within Ukraine, said “one of the parties cannot be cornered by means of 
unconstitutional activities. Otherwise other people in the region can say ‘Why don’t we act 
against the constitution?”145 Here Russia is demonstrating its preference for law and order within 
the Ukrainian constitution, in short, regime stability.  
Russia insisted however to respect the democratic process of Ukraine and Lavrov claimed that 
Russia had no “bets” in the presidential campaign.146 Lavrov claimed that Russia would respect 
any choice made by the Ukrainian people, and that any speculations of Russian election 
interference were based solely on a meeting held between Ukrainian President Kuchma, and 
Putin, which, as Lavrov claimed, were merely meeting to discuss the Russia-Ukrainian 
partnership. This would on the surface support the claim that Russia promotes non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of other states as a norm. However, this is directly opposed to claims 
made at the time. Russia was accused of attempts to “thwart” the western leaning candidate, 
Yushchenko, through a variety of, somewhat unpleasant, means. 147 Therefore, demonstrating a 
clear lack of regard for the EU backed democratic process, despite claims to the contrary.  
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Overall, the events of the Orange Revolution brought to the fore the beginnings of this normative 
clash, and lay the foundations for further conflicting norm promotion. Russia promoted the norm 
of regime stability over the need for a legitimate democracy. While the EU promoted the norm of 
interference, over Russia’s demands to respect sovereignty. The opposing ‘spheres’ of 
‘international society’ and ‘world society’ can frame these different approaches as the Russian 
‘international society’ supports sovereignty and regime stability, and the EU’s ‘world society’ 
sphere is promoting democracy and interference. In this section it also becomes clear that the 
‘normative battleground’ is centred around Russia rejecting the EU norms being imposed in 
Ukraine. Russia is promoting alternative norms to reject these norms, stemming from its 
‘modern’ outlook and securitising project.  
On issues such as sovereignty, and democracy promotion, these issues cannot yet be fully 
classified as a ‘battleground’. The issue of sovereignty with regards to Russian norm promotion 
is a complex one, that grows more complex across the ten-year time span of this research. Russia 
is adamant that Ukrainian sovereignty be respected, and yet also demonstrates a clear disregard 
for its own norm. Therefore, it is possible to interpret Russia’s promotion of sovereignty within 
Ukraine as, in reality, not a norm to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty, but that of Russia’s own.  
 
 
6.2: 2009: Counter Attacks on the ‘Normative Battleground’ 
 
The year 2009 forms the midway point of this empirical research, and is an important point of 
development for the ‘normative battleground’ as this year saw the introduction of the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership (EaP). This EaP has formed a key part of the EU’s securitising project within 
Ukraine since this point. Alongside the EaP, the year 2009 also brought the ratification of the 
EU’s Lisbon Treaty, which is relevant here as it gave the EU a more cohesive foreign and 
security policy, as well as supporting the EU’s aim of greater influence on the world stage.148 
Catherine Ashton was appointed as the first High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy to take charge of this more directed foreign policy. The year 2009 is 
also important as it was the year following the events of the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, 
which drastically altered the dynamic of EU-Russian relations. At the 2008 NATO summit in 
Bucharest, Ukraine and Georgia made NATO membership bids in opposition to Russia’s wishes, 
and when Russia made retaliatory measures, war broke out in August 2008.149 Russia’s 
intensions in the international arena were becoming clearer during this period, and at the same 
NATO summit, Putin gave a speech where he stated that Ukraine was an artificial country and 
that the greater part of the lands of Ukraine historically belonged to Russia.150  This year was 
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also an important halfway point to assess as events, for example, the gas dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine in 2009, were bringing the situation in Ukraine to the forefront of discussions in 
Europe. This was a period of more focused and heightened foreign policy outlooks for both the 
EU and Russia. 
 
6.2.1: The EU’s Securitising Project 
 
For the EU, 2009 brought the implementation of the EaP, a key platform for norm promotion 
within the EU’s neighbouring states to the east. The EaP was partly conceived to encourage the 
partner countries to adopt EU norms such as values of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and the rule of law.151 The framework of the EaP promoted “policy platforms” on 
democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration, energy security and contacts 
between people.152 While the EaP went further than norm promotion, in that it encouraged other 
alignment between the EU and Ukraine, such as economic, it can be pointed to as EU norm 
promotion. n the words of Stefan Füle, who was the Commissioner for Enlargement and the 
ENP, the EaP is equipped to “support democratic and market-orientated reforms in partner 
countries, consolidate their statehood and bring them closer to the EU.”153 In sum, the EaP would 
promote the normative alignment of Ukraine with the EU, particularly with norms such as 
democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. The EaP was to form a core part of the 
EU’s securitising measures and be an active policy through which to promote EU norms.    
 
6.2.2: Russia’s Securitising Project  
 
The Russian securitisation project in Ukraine in 2009 can be framed as being largely reactionary. 
At this stage, Russia was still reeling following the war with Georgia the previous year. In 2009, 
Russia was not only objecting to the actions of the EU, but also to perceived NATO interference, 
in their immediate neighbourhood. Furthermore, due to the timing of the announcement of the 
EaP initiative coinciding with loud criticism of Russia over their actions in Georgia, alongside 
the lack of an invitation to be a partner state, Russia perceived the EaP as being directed against 
them. The final document of the extraordinary European Council held in September linked the 
EU’s condemnation of Russian actions in Georgia, along with its decision to move ahead with 
the EaP.154 
 
The Russian governments perspective on the ENP in the previous years had been fairly muted in 
comparison to how the EaP was perceived. Lavrov, on multiple occasions, condemned the 
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establishment of the EaP and equated it to the establishment of an “EU zone of interest in 
Eastern Europe.”155 Russia was seeing the EaP through zero-sum, traditional, ‘modern’ eyes, and 
equating the EU’s actions with creating a ‘sphere of influence’. This led to Russia defensively 
promoting norms in order to maintain their sphere of influence including Ukraine.  
 
During this Russia began to see the EU as an increasingly important actor within the post-Soviet 
space. This led to Russia seeing the EU as a competitor and Russia saw the EaP as a threat to 
Russia’s security within the neighbourhood. Russia saw the EU’s actions in Ukraine as a 
deliberate attempt at excluding Russia, not providing further cooperation, and thereby, not 
respecting Russia as a legitimate international actor. In Russia’s 2020 Security Strategy brought 
in in 2009, it is discussed how the international system has transitioned from “opposing blocs to 
principles of multivector diplomacy”156 which means Russia was going to defend their right as a 
legitimate actor in the international system and to reinforce its influence. At this stage, within 
Ukraine, this would have meant countering the EaP and the norms it was seeking to promote. For 
example, this would have involved a keen defence of the principals of the Westphalian world, 
which Lavrov complained, had “become a fashionable object of criticism in certain circles.” An 
article written by Lavrov highlights the key norms that Russia was promoting at this stage. The 
article, titled “Containing Russia: back to the future?” 157 explained that Russia was promoting 
“the maintenance of international stability” and “natural evolution of international relations 
towards freedom and democracy”. These can be taken as almost direct criticism of the EU and 
their norm promotion within Ukraine, particularly their promotion of democracy and the 
instability this had previously caused. 
 
Overall, the securitising projects in 2009 are actually both reacting to a sense of threat. For the 
EU, the EaP was partly formed in response to Poland’s concerns about the eastern 
neighbourhood. For Russia, they felt they were witnessing an attempt to belittle their role in their 
perceived ‘sphere of influence’. Russia was promoting norms at this stage to counter the EU’s 
norm promotion, which they saw forming a key part of this threat. These securitising projects 
can be tied in with their foreign policy outlooks. For example, the EU’s plans to spread its norms 
beyond its borders, for closer cooperation with Ukraine, and for higher levels of ‘interference’, 
are all part of the “postmodern” outlook on security. Whereas Russia is viewing the EU’s actions 
in Ukraine through a zero-sum 19th century mind-set where the actions of the EU are diminishing 
Russia’s influence. Therefore, Russia attempted to counter the EU’s norms of democracy 
promotion and deepening cooperation, in order to maintain influence in their neighbourhood. For 
Russia, this is achieved by promoting sovereignty and the natural evolution of political systems. 
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6.2.3: The ‘Normative Battleground’  
 
This 2009 juncture sees a departure from the earlier categorisation of the EU as promoting 
sovereignty pooling, and the belief that Russia was advocating for absolute sovereignty to be 
upheld in Ukraine. Poland, as an EU member state, sought to create an eastern dimension for the 
EU, that included Ukraine, even before their 2004 admittance. This desire was motivated by the 
idea that Poland’s sovereignty could only be guaranteed if Ukraine’s sovereignty was also 
protected from Russia.158 This would frame the development of the EaP as a way of ensuring 
Ukraine’s sovereignty, despite also being a way for the EU to, in Russia’s eyes, interfere and 
undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. The EU was seen in 2009 as a protector and enforcer of 
sovereignty in the neighbourhood, despite promoting deep integration as part of the EaP, and 
sovereignty not actively being promoted as a norm in the area. This would imply that the EU 
member states did not believe that Russia would uphold the norm of sovereignty, and relied on 
the EU to ensure that it did.   
 
In spite of this, Russia viewed the EaP as an affront to the concept of sovereignty, and one which 
denied any possibility of “free and information choice for European integration by post-Soviet 
states.” 159 In March 2009 speaking at the Brussels Forum, Lavrov stated that “we are accused of 
trying to intimidate or pressure others. What is the Eastern Partnership? Is it not a case of 
intimidating and pressuring others”, and asked is this “threats, blackmail or democracy at work?” 
For Russia, they believed that the EU and west had diluted this concept of sovereignty, and that 
Russia’s current aim was to position itself as the champion of the autonomy of sovereign 
states.160 Even though the EaP, as discussed, was partly designed in order to provide assurances 
of sovereignty to states such as Ukraine, Russia perceived the actions of the EU as a direct 
assault on the concept. In 2008 Prime Minister Medvedev, just prior to becoming President, 
wrote how ‘sovereignty’ and ‘Europeanisation’ were “two competing bureaucratic strategies of 
managing globalisation”161 Here this highlights the extent to which Russia did not see Europe as 
being in any sense a promoter of sovereignty. Russia was seen as reinforcing sovereignty, while 
the EU worked to promote “ambiguity” along its periphery. Furthermore, as Derek Averre has 
claimed, Putin has rejected liberal interdependence in favour of “illiberal sovereign statism” to 
guarantee power and influence in the international system.162 
 
Russia saw the EaP as potentially dangerous to its own sovereignty, and that the allegiance of 
Ukraine with the EU would diminish Russia’s power and influence in the neighbourhood. 
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Russia, with its ‘modern’ securitising outlook, set itself up as a protector of the norm of 
sovereignty, in response to the EU’s perceived ‘postmodern’ stance, which is in favour of 
pooling sovereignty. However, in this case there begins to be a blurring of the lines between 
‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ norms. Russia was claiming to be the guarantor of state sovereignty, 
despite its recent actions in Georgia and despite the foundations of the EaP as seeking to protect 
neighbouring states sovereignty. Russia was using the norm of sovereignty to distinguish itself 
from the norms promoted by the EU, and to undermine the legitimacy of the EU norms, despite 
not showing any evidence of their intent to promote the norm in their neighbourhood in any 
meaningful sense.  
 
The EU’s EaP included an aspect of encouraging ‘good governance’ and the EU was actively 
seeking in 2009 to promote democracy within Ukraine. Russia, along with the EU, claimed to 
support democracy, yet in contrast to the EU, did not claim to promote democracy and instead 
privileged regime stability as a norm. However, earlier in 2006, the concept of ‘sovereign 
democracy’ was developed within Russia and this can be analysed within the ‘normative 
battleground’ framework. This is relevant to Russian norm promotion within Ukraine as Nicu 
Popescu wrote how despite at first the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ being a domestic 
concept, it also became about “extending this ‘sovereignty’ to neighbours”.163 Popescu explained 
that while the concept was deliberately vague and therefore difficult to accurately grasp, it can be 
understood as ‘non-interference from the West’. Therefore, this concept is meant as a 
counterexample to Ukraine. Secondly, Popescu argues that the idea behind ‘sovereign 
democracy’ is democracy distinct from western democracy, that Russia has its own values which 
are democratic, but are unique to Russia. Here, the point is that Russia was promoting a form of 
democracy separate from the western understanding of the norm. Ivan Krastev supports this 
theory and wrote how “Russia will not fight democracy, Russia will fight for democracy - its 
kind of democracy.”164 This demonstrates how Russia was seeking to counter the EU’s form of 
democracy promotion within the neighbourhood 
 
Overall, the development of the ‘normative battleground’ in 2009 becomes slightly more 
complicated. Russia was also promoting norms that on the surface, mirror EU promoted norms.  
Russian was claiming to support development of democracy, but a distinct form of democracy. 
Furthermore, at this stage the EU is pointed to as a guarantor of sovereignty, despite this being a 
well promoted Russian norm, and despite the EU promoting norms such as interference. The 
‘normative battleground’ here can be summarised as developing through Russia seeking to 
counter EU promoted norms, not merely oppose as in 2004. This can be seen through the 
alternative concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ to counter the EU’s promotion of democracy. 
Russia was seeking to normatively be the west’s equal, yet did not want to adhere to the liberal 
backed securitising norms the EU was promoting. Russia also sought to promote norms that 
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could lead to the reimagining of itself as a ‘great power’. This helps explain why Russia was 
seeking to promote norms, not just to counter EU norms, but to provide a normative alternative, 
solidifying itself as an equally legitimate power.  
 
6.3: 2014: The Culmination of the ‘Normative Battleground’  
 
By 2014 it was clear that President Putin saw the EU as a threat to Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’ 
in the east, particularly with Ukraine. This perceived threat had been building since the 2004 
Orange Revolution and led to Russia successfully pressuring Ukraine into deferring signing the 
Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in November 2013.165 This perceived “threat” 
stemmed from the way the AA could pull Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit. The AA and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements (DCFTA’s) were also seen as incompatible with 
Putin’s plan to expand Russia’s Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan and create a 
“Eurasian Union,” to counter the EU project. Furthermore, Putin saw the Eurasian Union as a 
buffer against “civilizational” ideas and values from Europe and the West. This threat was that, if 
the AA was signed Ukraine would become more European and, implicitly, less “Eurasian.” The 
failure of Ukrainian president, Yanukovych, to sign the EU AA led to the protest movement in 
Kiev that became known as Euromaidan. The protests erupted in November 2013 and culminated 
in 2014. The AA, had been seen by the Ukrainians protesting in Maidan Square as not only, “an 
opportunity to rebuild, through free trade accords, their shattered economy, but to defend their 
country’s fragile standards on democracy, human rights, and freedom of press”,166 key norms 
that were being promoted by the EU at that time.  
 
6.3.1: The EU’s Securitising Project  
 
For the EU, the AA formed part of the EaP introduced in 2009, and it formed a core part of their 
securitising project at this time. The AA was aimed at fostering and achieving peace, security 
and stability on the European continent. It sought to underpin Ukraine’s development and 
included a deep political association between Ukraine and the EU. These agreements also 
included economic integration and DCFTAs, but this research will focus on the political 
association aspect with the norm promotion. The agreements largely contained a reform agenda 
through which Ukraine could align itself with the EU by approximating EU norms.167 The AA 
focused on support for core reforms, such as encouraging good governance, equal rights, 
cooperation, education, cultural cooperation, social development, and increased people-to-people 
contacts between EU and Ukrainian citizens. The AA foresaw the intensification of cooperation 
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between the EU and Ukraine, even to the extent of a gradual convergence in the areas of mutual 
cooperation on defence and security.168 The norms the EU was promoting in Ukraine at this time 
can largely fit within the EU’s ‘postmodern’ outlook, as pooling sovereignty for security and 
democracy promotion played a core part.  
 
6.3.2: Russia’s Securitising Project  
 
Russia’s securitising project in 2014 was based on a more “modern” interpretation of 
international society, and once again, is not as clearly laid out as the EU securitising project. But 
it is largely possible to frame the securitising project as aiming to keep Ukraine within a Russian 
‘sphere of influence’, a “modern” concept. While Russia did not seek to recreate the Soviet 
Union, there was a desire to keep Ukraine from ‘Europeanising’, as well as a desire for deference 
from neighbouring states.169 Ukraine’s decision to shelve the AA with the EU taken by 
Yanukovych can be pointed to as a direct example of Russia’s securitising project within 
Ukraine. The Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, spoke of how he was aware that prior 
to Yanukovych meeting with Putin, he had wanted to sign the AA, but that in November 2013, 
“something happened”. 170 The Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, disclosed that the 
Ukrainian U-turn on the AA was due to Putin demanding a say in, and a delay to, the signing of 
the agreement.171 These statements here can provide evidence that the Russian securitising 
project at this time was to apply pressure on Ukraine in order to keep Ukraine within their sphere 
of influence - a factor deemed crucial for maintaining Russian security. This was also to be 
achieved by countering EU influence within Ukraine through their norm promotion, and through 
this chapter it becomes clear that Russia used aggressively promoted norms to counter EU 
norms, and promoted norms to manipulate the application and interpretation of EU norms, in 
order to prevent Ukraine leaving their sphere of influence.  
 
These two different styles of securitising within Ukraine can be tied to the different worldviews 
of the EU and Russia. The EU, with its emphasis on expansion through cooperation, domestic 
interference, democracy and human rights emphasis can be laid within the ‘postmodern’ outlook 
for security. In contrast, the Russian ‘modern’ approach is applying pressure, looking to protect a 
sphere of influence, promoting concepts such as sovereignty, non-interference and regime 
stability. Interestingly enough, the EU argued that in comparison to Russia’s Custom’s Union, 
the AA proposed by the “the EU provides explicit legal and political guarantees of sovereignty, 
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independence and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state.”172 Whereas, in joining the Russian 
Custom’s Union “Ukraine would lose its sovereign power to decide for itself on its future trade 
and economic policy,” in essence losing sovereignty to Russia, the largest Customs Union 
member. This is interesting as these norms, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, 
are largely “modern” Russian norms. 
 
6.3.3: The ‘Normative Battleground’ 
 
Territorial Integrity or Territorial Integrity?  
 
The norm of territorial integrity is a widely held international norm, not just a Russian promoted 
norm, and is promoted outside of the “modern” outlook. Under the United Nations charter, it 
clearly stated “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”173 In addition, both 
the EU and Russia comply with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 where “Western and Communist 
bloc leaders pledged to respect the inviolability of borders.”174 Adherence to this norm has also 
been pledged by Russia and the EU through these international agreements: for the EU, “respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”175 and for Russia, in the 
2009 National Security Strategy, perceived “the United Nations as a central element of a stable 
system of international relations”.176 This should leave no doubt of the EU’s and Russia’s 
commitment, on the surface, to upholding this norm, and yet this is a norm through which this 
“battleground” has developed.  
 
A key example from 2014 are the events of February 2014, when Ukrainian officials claimed the 
Crimean peninsula was being occupied by Russian troops, and accused Moscow of 
‘orchestrating a military invasion and occupation’.177 The new Ukrainian interior minister, Arsen 
Avakov decried the events as being in “violation of all international treaties and norms” and that 
it was “a direct provocation aimed at armed bloodshed on the territory of a sovereign state.” By 
March, the peninsula had been annexed following a referendum held on 16th March. This section 
will discuss how the different securitising projects led to a different application of the norm of 
territorial integrity which developed into a “normative battleground”.  
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Throughout Europe and the West, it was widely believed that “international law was violated” 
with the annexation of Ukraine’s territory. 178 In November, the Council of Europe adopted a 
resolution to find a solution to the crisis based on “respect for Ukraine’s independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”179 Catherine Ashton, the EU’s top diplomat, stated her goal 
at crisis talks in Minsk “was to ensure the former Soviet republic can safeguard its territorial 
integrity.”180 President of the European Commission, Barroso, in a speech reminded that the 
Helsinki Final Act “established territorial integrity as central to the European security order.”181 
The annexation of Crimea by Russia, Barroso denounced as a “blunt challenge to international 
law and order.” Since March 2014, “the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures in 
response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine.182” These 
actions show the EU clearly calling for the territorial integrity of Ukraine to be respected.  
 
In contrast, for Russia, the annexation of Crimea means the restoration of Russian territorial 
integrity. Russia’s use of the word “reunification” implies that Russia’s territorial integrity was 
not respected before, this is not a violation but a correction of previous wrongdoings - Russia’s 
territorial integrity was previously not respected. In the State Duma address following the 
annexation, Putin spoke of how of how Crimean residents spoke out “in favour of reuniting with 
Russia”183 and how Crimea has “returned to its homeland.” The decision to transfer Crimea to 
Ukraine “was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then.” 
This action is not an attack on territorial integrity, but righting a previously violated norm. The 
original violation was against Russia’s own territorial integrity, Putin makes clear he believed “it 
was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it was not 
simply robbed, it was plundered.” For Putin, reunification means protecting territorial integrity 
and righting the wrong, clear in his words: “In the hearts and minds of people, Crimea has 
always been and remains an inseparable part of Russia.”184 For Putin, there was no violation of 
any norms in ‘reunifying’ Crimea with Russia. The promotion of territorial integrity by Russia 
contained a different interpretation and application of the norm. 
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This difference in interpretation of the “territorial integrity” norm is a fundamental aspect of the 
“normative battleground” at this stage, and can be tied to the differing securitising projects of the 
EU and Russia. For the EU, it is objecting to the annexation as a violation of a sovereign state, 
Barroso spoke of how “nobody recognised the annexation of Crimea.”185  Making such territorial 
claims on other states territory is reminiscent of the ‘modern’ securitising project, a Hobbesian 
state of world order rather than a Kantian. Where annexation implies undercutting a country’s 
territorial integrity, reunifying implies restoring a country’s territorial integrity. Russia is still 
respecting the norm of territorial integrity in their eyes, but in an opposing way to the EU’s 
interpretation. 
 
Russia previously had promoted the norm of territorial integrity, but does not see the case is the 
same with Crimea. This type of action was labelled earlier by Putin himself as an anachronism. 
In 2005, following a meeting with EU leaders, Putin angrily chastised the Baltic states for, 
“clinging to historic grievances over Soviet domination.” 186 Putin stated he hoped Latvia and 
Estonia would not make “idiotic” territorial demands” and that in Europe in the 21st century, 
when one country is making territorial claims against another, “this is complete nonsense – soft 
boiled boots! (a Russian idiom for an absurdity.)” 187 Here Putin is making the point that 
territorial claims on other sovereign nations are no longer part of a 21st century foreign policy, 
insinuating that to make such claims, would be a return to a 19th century outlook. One which it is 
possible to attach to a “modern” outlook.  
 
Overall, Russia is using a widely held international norm, territorial integrity, a norm which 
Russia themselves has consistently promoted, to justify a violation of international norms with 
the annexation of Crimea. By annexing a neighbouring country’s territory “Putin overturned in a 
single stroke the assumptions on which the post-Cold War European order had rested.”188   
Russia not strictly adhering to the norms it espouses, demonstrating that the norms can shift to 
suit the securitising agenda.  
 
Democracy or Democracy? 
 
In order to provide some semblance of legitimacy for the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, 
Russia sought a referendum, an established and accepted form of direct democracy. For the EU 
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and the EaP, democracy promotion and good governance formed a fundamental pillar of the 
norm promotion. Russia used this norm of democracy to legitimise their actions in Ukraine and 
to undermine the actions of the EU and the Ukrainian opposition, this led to the development of a 
“normative battleground” over whose interpretation of democracy held more legitimacy within 
Ukraine.  
 
In the eyes of the EU, “the ‘so-called referendum’ was ‘illegal under the constitution of Ukraine 
and under international law,”189 declared Catherine Ashton. This was in stark contrast to Russia 
who organised the referendum. Following the annexation, Putin declared “a referendum was held 
in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms.” 
Russia claimed that more than 82% of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96% of them 
spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. Putin declared, “these numbers speak for 
themselves.”190 Even if the figure of 96% in favour was proved accurate, the EU would not have 
backed the referendum as it was, in their eyes, illegal. In a declaration by the EU’s High 
Representative on Crimea, it stated “the EU does not recognise and continues to condemn this 
act of violation of international law. The illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the 
Russian Federation is also a direct challenge to international security, with grave implications for 
the international legal order.”191 This here demonstrates a conflicting application and 
interpretation of democratic measures. For the EU, the referendum violated international law and 
therefore could not be valid, despite advocating for democracy promotion within Ukraine. Russia 
used the referendum, and the claim that it was in full compliance with democratic measures and 
international norms, to use this EU promoted norm to legitimise the previous violation through 
the annexation of Crimea.   
  
In November 2014, pro-Russian separatists held elections in both the Donetsk and Lugansk 
People’s Republics, which Kiev and the EU refused to recognise. These elections were held in 
order to give the breakaway regions some form of legitimacy through democratic means. The 
election commission chief of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Roman Lyagin, claimed that “these 
elections are important because they will give legitimacy to our power and give us more distance 
from Kiev.”192 Russia stated that they would recognise the election results, and this backing 
sparked criticism from Europe. Russia said it would recognise the polls as “a way of granting the 
separatists electoral legitimacy.”193 This is a further example of a different application of the 
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norm democracy. Russia is advocating for a norm usually promoted by the EU in order to 
legitimise norm violations, such as of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  This is part of the 
“battleground” and there is a disagreement over which is the legitimate holder of the norm of 
democracy. For Russia, they don’t see the EU as having the monopoly on the interpretation of 
democracy.  
 
This “normative battleground” can also be addressed from the opposite side, with Russia 
criticising the EU’s backing of ‘democracy’ within Ukraine. In October 2014 there were fresh 
national parliamentary elections due to take place in Kiev that were backed by the EU but 
rejected by Russia. The EU welcomed the holding of these elections which they believed 
“marked an important step in Ukraine’s aspirations to consolidate its democratic development in 
line with its international commitments.”194 These new elections would ensure much needed 
political and economic reforms, those which the EU sought through its AA, and EaP initiative. 
However, according to Russia these new elections to be held in Ukraine were the result of a 
violent coup. Ukraine, according to President Putin, had had an “unconstitutional coup” by 
protesters in Kiev, expelling the democratically elected government.195 Putin added that 
President Yanukovych was Ukraine’s legitimate leader and had been deposed an “an armed 
seizure of power”. Hence, these new elections are illegitimate as they are the result of an 
undemocratic action. Russia continued to criticise EU in order to support their position as a 
legitimate democracy promoter. In countering the EU’s position on the Crimean referendum, 
Russia “call foul” over a key member states own referendum. Following the September 2014 
Scottish independence referendum, Russia declared it “did not meet international standards.”196  
This was a core criticism levelled at Russia over the Crimean referendum.  
 
This leads us to the crux of the clash between the EU and Russia leading to the “normative 
battleground”; which claim to democracy has legitimacy within Ukraine? Both the EU and 
Russia are claiming to promote democracy yet both desire vastly different outcomes from this 
democracy promotion within Ukraine. The EU claims to represent the legitimate form of 
democracy. Federica Mogherini’s first newspaper interview as successor to Catherine Ashton 
“denounced the elections in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of eastern Ukraine as illegal and 
illegitimate and praised President Petro Poroshenko for his full commitment to the Minsk 
accords.”197 The EU went on to claim that they are promoting the only legitimate elections, 
stating that “these so-called “elections” are in breach of the letter and the spirit of the Minsk 
protocol. … all sides should work towards early local elections in these parts of the Donetsk and 
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Luhansk regions in accordance with Ukrainian law, as foreseen in the Minsk Protocol, as the 
only legal and legitimate means of renewing the democratic mandate of the local authorities.”198  
Whereas for Russia, the referendum and elections held in eastern Ukraine were to provide the 
actions with international legitimacy. Russia has made clear during the previous 10 years that the 
EU does not have the monopoly on legitimate norms to be promoted within Ukraine.  
 
Overall, the EU was, and is, vocal about the importance of developing democracy within 
Ukraine. This is a core goal of the EaP and the AA, and democracy promotion is a consistent EU 
promoted norm within Ukraine. Russia sought to use democracy as an internationally recognised 
norm to justify actions the actions, such as annexing Crimea, within Ukraine. Russia here was 
using a ‘postmodern’ norm, democracy, in order to justify ‘modern’ securitising behaviour.  
 
Sovereignty or Sovereignty? 
 
The Russian promoted norm of respecting sovereignty and non-interference in other countries 
domestic affairs forms part of the “normative battleground” that has developed within Ukraine. 
Russia accused the EU of interfering in Ukraine and therefore undermining Ukrainian 
sovereignty. While the EU accused Russia of applying political and economic pressure on 
Ukraine to keep it from being able to make sovereign decisions. This here is adding to the 
development of the “normative battleground”.  
 
The Maidan protests in Ukraine that began in 2013 were sparked by the non-signing of the EU’s 
AA agreement with Ukraine. As has been well established throughout this research, Russia 
deems EU interference with Ukraine as an infringement on its sovereignty. However, with the 
AA the situation becomes more complex. Sergei Glazyez, an adviser to President Putin said “the 
political and social cost of EU integration could also be high, and allowed for the possibility of 
separatist movements springing up in the Russian-speaking east and south of Ukraine. He 
suggested that if Ukraine signed the agreement, Russia would consider the bilateral treaty that 
delineates the country's’ borders to be void.”199 Here demonstrating that Russia would not 
respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. Glazyez added, “legally, signing this agreement about association 
with EU, the Ukrainian government violates the treaty on strategic partnership and friendship 
with Russia … when this happened, he said, Russia could no longer guarantee Ukraine’s status 
as a state and could possibly intervene if pro-Russian regions of the country appealed directly to 
Moscow.” This here is a direct threat against Ukraine’s sovereignty if they moved towards closer 
integration with the EU. This can also be interpreted as Russian interference in an attempt to 
counter the EU’s interference.  
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The Maidan protests in Kiev formed another aspect of this “normative battleground” developing 
over the concept of sovereignty. For Russia, seeing EU officials encouraging the Maidan 
protestors was an assault on Ukraine’s sovereignty. The EU’s Catherine Ashton was welcomed 
at the protests and gave them a message of encouragement saying “I was among you on Maidan 
in the evening and was impressed by the determination of Ukrainians demonstrating for the 
European perspective of their country.”200 Lavrov in turn accused the EU of “stirring up the 
situation”,201 adding that several members of European governments rushed to Maidan uninvited 
and took part in anti-government demonstrations, describing this action as “indecent.” Lavrov 
added that they had received information that much of the protests were being stimulated from 
abroad, which would have been seen in Russia as a high level of EU interference within 
Ukrainian society. Lavrov further condemned the violence of the protestors as being “a complete 
violation of European standards of behaviour.” 
 
The Russian outlook on Ukrainian sovereignty is one that has been widely debated. Timothy 
Snyder discussed an event when the Russian Ambassador to France, Alexander Orlov, reportedly 
claimed the state of Ukraine did not exist.202 According to Synder, Orlov declared “Russians and 
Ukrainians are one nation. It’s like the Bretons and the Normans in France. You can’t separate 
them.”203 The connotations of this statement for Ukrainian sovereignty are clear, that from the 
Russian mind-set, Ukraine is not a fully separate state from Russia. The Ambassador was also 
not merely expressing a privately held opinion, Putin had previously made such a remark. When 
speaking with western journalists Putin made a similar claim: that Russians and Ukrainians are 
“one nation”. Therefore, there is no such thing as illegitimate Russian ‘intervention’ within 
Ukraine, as Russia has the legitimate right to do so. Following from this, it is the EU’s 
interference in Ukraine that is illegitimate, and Russia is unable to undermine Ukrainian 
sovereignty, the EU is therefore responsible for violating sovereignty as it acknowledges Ukraine 
as an independent state.   
 
Overall, 2014 provided the clearest demonstration of the ‘normative battleground’. Here there 
were clear examples of Russia, somewhat aggressively, countering EU norm promotion within 
Ukraine. Furthermore, there were examples of Russia taking EU promoted norms and providing 
an alternative interpretation. An interpretation that directly opposed the stance the EU was taking 
on the norm at that time in Ukraine, for example, the ‘battleground’ over the norm of territorial 
integrity. This shows how in 2014, the ‘normative battleground’ was not merely composed of 
conflicting norms, but of an understanding of how that norm should be interpreted and applied. 
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This also brings in the concept of legitimacy, as in Russia’s opinion, the EU does not have the 
monopoly on the legitimate norms to be promoted within Ukraine.  
The development of the ‘normative battleground’ at this stage can still be tied in with Buzan’s 
spheres, despite the norms not necessarily stemming directly from the ‘spheres’. Even though the 
norms did not stem directly from the spheres, the interpretation and application of the norms did. 
For Russia, the use of territorial integrity was more closely tied to regaining power and 
influence, than to the norm itself. The use of norms in this context is more closely related to 
power and security, than to the norms themselves. For the EU the spreading of norms is about 
creating a neighbourhood that mirrors the EU, but for Russia it is about power, influence and 
stability, here it is possible to identify Buzan’s ‘international society’ and ‘world society’ spheres 
within the actions of the EU and Russia.  
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Conclusion   
 
This thesis sought to trace the development of a ‘normative battleground’ within Ukraine 
between the EU and Russia from 2004 to 2014, with the norms being promoted stemming from 
the opposing securitising projects being implemented by both parties within Ukraine. The initial 
aim was to frame these norms within the ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ securitising projects, and 
while this was largely possible, the reality was much more nuanced. Russia did not merely 
promote norms stemming from a ‘modern’ securitising outlook, and the EU did not only promote 
norms stemming from a ‘postmodern’ outlook. 2004 saw the beginnings of the ‘normative 
battleground’ following, and during, the events of the ‘Orange Revolution’. Overall, Russia was 
largely backing ‘modern’ norms, such as non-interference and regime stability, where the EU 
was backing ‘postmodern’ norms such as interference and democracy promotion. During this 
juncture it became clear that the ‘normative battleground’ in 2004 was centred around Russia 
rejecting the EU norms being promoted in Ukraine. Russia was promoting alternative norms in 
order to reject the EU backed norms, stemming from its ‘modern’ outlook and securitising 
project. 
 
In 2009, the process of development of the ‘normative battleground’ altered slightly and became 
slightly more nuanced. The EU was actively promoting norms from their ‘postmodern’ outlook 
in order to shape the development of Ukraine. Whereas, Russia was not only criticising EU norm 
promotion, but also promoted norms that on the surface mirrored those of the EU, for example, 
the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. The ‘normative battleground’ here can be summarised as 
developing through Russia seeking to counter EU promoted norms, not merely oppose as in 
2004. Russia was seeking to normatively be the west’s equal, yet did not want to adhere to the 
liberal backed securitising norms the EU was promoting. 2014 provided the greatest 
demonstration of the ‘normative battleground’ between the EU and Russia within Ukraine. 
Within this section there were examples of the EU and Russia, not only promoting clashing 
norms, but also having wildly different interpretations and applications of the same norm. In 
2014 Russia was taking EU backed norms and applying them selectively, adding to the 
development of the ‘normative battleground’. An example is the application of the norm, 
territorial integrity, which led to very different applications of the EU and Russia. It is these 
interpretations that can be tied, once more, to the securitising projects. In that, Russia was 
behaving as a 19th century ‘modern’ power, when annexing Crimea. The EU’s incomprehension 
at this act further underlined the different ‘worlds’ the EU and Russia belong to. 
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